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1.

1.0. Introduction and Objectives

Oil is now being explored in many parts of Namibia both
onshore and offshore. The discovery of the gas field known as
"Kudu Gas Field” along the southern coastal line of Namibia
and high expectation of oil onshore in Etosha and Nama basins
are main focus of this dissertation. Whereas the threat of
oil spill along the Namibian coast was never investigated or
recorded and crude oil never being handled or transported
along the Namibian coast, the government should aware of the
environmental impacts of exploitation and production of those
resources. What one needs to be aware of are the problems to
be caused by marine oil spill. These problems may vary in
degrees. The obvious ones are those of containment, recovery,
clean-up disposal, jurisdiction and responsibilities for
environmental restoration.
Marine pollution may not only threaten the marine
environment and its resources but also other resources
onshore and other places such as port facilities are to be
affected as well. Pollution is not only a problem for experts
and scienticities as it has been some years ago. The World
Conference on Environment and Development, " Earth Summit",
held in June 1992 at Rio de Janeiro in Brazil proves this
statement. Today pollution is being tackled at high political
levels. The attendance of powerful delegations including the
heads of states and other high ranging officials at this
summit shows the seriousness about pollution problems world
wide .
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Oil pollution of the marine environment which is the
concern in this paper is part and parcel of the global
pollution threatening the world today. Like other pollutants,
oil pollution does not recognize the artificial or political
boundaries. Oil pollution gets into the marine environment
through two major different ways, such as deliberate
discharge of oil waste and other oil particulars into the sea
and accidental spillage. The first category has been delt
with considerably at national and international levels. But
still a lot of efforts are required to accomplish it. The
major problem lies with the latter, which arises as a result
of ship coalition, grounding, wrecking and so on.
Marine accidents occur from time to time world wide.
The worst examples of such accidents are the Torrey Cannyon
in 1967, Argo Merchant in 1976, Amoco Cadiz in 1978 the Exxon
Valdez in 1989 and the fire on board of the Agip Abrozzo (the
V.L.C.C.) carrying 130 000 tonnes of oil along the Italian
coast in April 1991. The recent example of that nature is the
incident involving an oil tanker (the Katina P.) along the
Mozambican coast in April 1992. It was reported that the
Mozambican government was "facing an environmental disaster
and appealed for international help after a 66 000 tonnes
capacity oil tanker went aground 20km. north of Inhaca Island
near Maputo. Furthermore, the Mozambican Foreign Minister who
appeal for international help was quoted saying "everything
now depends on the time and weather"
Following his request for international assistance in
both judicial and technical matters the British experts were
reported to have brought about 40 tonnes of oil pollution
equipment meanwhile 160 tonnes of similar equipment was sent
to Maputo by road and sea from Cape Town, South Africa.
According to Mr. Jan Lud (Adviser of the Norwegian Maritime
Inspection Department), the Mozambican authority was not
prepared for any incident of that nature. The amount of oil
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leaked from that particular tanker was estimated at about 500
tonnes from which 300 tonnes went ashore. The clean-up
operation which was supervised by the Internal Tanker Owners
Association involved up to 1000 local labourers."^
Now the question is. Does Namibia need to wait or to
experience a similar situation in order to establish herself
in a better position ? It is upon the above ground the author
based his augment and tried to find out what Namibia could do
to avoid such a possible situation occurring in Namibia by
mobilizing and developing her resources either unilaterally
or bi-laterally within the concepts of oil contingency
planning and emergence response.
This dissertation is focusing on the issues of oil
pollution in the marine environment resulting from both'
accidents and operational of ships, platforms, oil terminals,
at ports and other places in Namibia as' the case might be. It
aims at the implementation of the Prevention and Combating Of
Pollution Of The Sea By Oil Act, 1991.
The paper briefly explores the oil situation in Namibia ^
before and after independence and its future perspective in
relation to the marine environment protection. This has been
done with the purpose of establishing the facts that led to
the setting up of na'tional institutions to deal with oil
spill at national and local levels. The necessary statements
for each chapter or section is given at the beginning of the
section concerned.
The paper is divided into six parts five chapters and
appendixes and bibiography at the end. The first chapter
(Chapter 1) deals with the general information including the
introduction, objectives and the brief description of
Namibia's marine environment and it's resources. This chapter
lays the foundation of others to follow.
The second chapter (Chapter 2) covers general aspects of
oil pollution. It elaborates further, the types of oil, its
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sources, behavior into waters in case of spill and the
international efforts on controlling marine oil pollution.
The chapter gives the readers a broad knowledge of oil
pollution and its related matters.
The third chapter (Chapter 3> deals with the>Namibian *
situation in depth. It explains the activities related to oil
exploration, marine pollution prevention and regulatory
measures taken before and after independence with
specific references to oil pollution.
The fourth chapter (chapter 4) covers the proposals put
forward by the author on the subject matter. This is the main
part of the dissertation whereby all the experiences learned
from previous charter are brought together and new ideas are
being developed. The chapter is sub~divided further into two
parts

namely, part A and B. Part A is being dedicated to

preventive measures while part B is dedicated to emergency
response.
The fifth part (Chapter 5) of the project deals with
conclusions and recommendations on the above discussions.
Readers are being advised to read this chapter for
comprehensive ideas on the subject.
At the end are appendixes, references and bibiography.
Readers are being adviced to read the paper in a
chronological order of the chapters as all are inter related
to each other. No chapter should be read in isolation from
the other as they keep referring to one another all the way
through.
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1.2.

Namibia In Brief

As mentioned on page 4 above, the chapter in general,
and this section in particular lays the basis for the
dissertation. The section provides a brief description of the
country's history and those of other sectors of its economy.
All the of these are directly or indirectly related to
pollution in general and that of the marine environment
in particular. Upon such information historical event has
been traced and conclusion has been drawn.
Namibia is a country of 2489 square km.

with a

population of 1.4 million people.*^’ It is located in the south
western part of Africa. The country was under foreign
administrations and domination for more than hundred years
but at last attained its independence on 21st March 1990.
The country was a German colony from 1884 to 1915. Following
the Germans defeat by the South African forces, in 1915 the i
territory felt under the South African military rule to 1920
when it v/as placed under a Mandate System by the League of
Nations. After the German relinquished their claim to Namibia
in 1919 the South West African Mandate, as the country was
called, was conferred on His Brittanic Majesty the King of
Great Britain in 1920, who in turn handed the mandate to
South Africa to exercise it on his behalf."-^
From that date onwards the South African authority tried
to annex the territory to the Republic of South Africa. The
move was countered by the international community, the League
of Nations by then. In 1967 South Africa (S.A.) was declared
illegal in Namibia by the United Nations and the territory
was renamed Namibia after the Namib desert which saved the
territory from early foreign intruders.®
From 1967 Namibia was legally presumed to be
administered by the United Nations Council for Namibia which
was established the same year. Much could not be achieved by
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the council as S.A. could not let the council administer the
territory from its boundary. In 1989 S.A. agreed to the
implementation of the United Nation Resolution 435 calling
for UN. supervised elections in Namibia, which led to the
establishment of an independent Namibian government in 1990.
(A) Economic Background
Namibia is rich in both minerals, agricultural and
fisheries resources. All these resources had been subjected
to foreign exploitation, which resulted in over exploitation
of fisheries and neglegence of other sectors of economy, such
as crop production and subsistence agricultural farming.
Namibia's economy was dominated by onshofe mining throughout
the colonial periods. There are more than 50 and other
precious stones scattered all over the country and about 40
mines in operation.*^
Currently all mineral rights are vested in the state ,
but exploration and mining are exclusively undertaken by the
private sector. The mining consequences on the environmental
and ecological system have been questionable all those years.
A study by the United Nations Institute for Namibia the then
Lusaka based institute from 1976 to 1991 cautioned them about
the environmental impact of diamond mining activities along
the coast whereby sands are removed from one place to another
The managing Director of three major fishing companies at
Luderitz criticized the diamond mining techniques used around
Luderitz for the declining in the lobster industry.
Such a
method has been employed since the late 50's and no studies
on the environmental impacts has been carried out all the
years.
No environmental threats have been indicated from
the agricultural sector as there are no extensive
agricultural activities along the coast due to its nature
which is a desert region and no crop farming along the rivers
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with extensive uses of fertilizers.

(B) Coastal Line And Sea Ports
The coast of Namibia runs in an almost straight line for
about 135 km. in direction NNW—SSE. It runs in north west
direction 24 to 40 degrees (Hollas Bird Island) and 16 to 20
degrees (Cape Frio) But at 16 degrees it diffects north and
then north—North—eastwards into Angola.See the attached
map (la), before this chapter. Much of the Namibian coast is
characterized by the narrow belt of low-lying land dunes of
the desert.
Much of the sea bottom is featureless, consisting of a
wide shelves bounded by the 300 km. isobeth, which extends
some 90 to 100 km. off the shore between Cape Cross (21 to 50
degrees). In the Northern area, a sharp increase in depth
,
occurs to the west of the Cape Frio where the Walvis Ridge
joins the African continent. From there onwards, the shelf
slopes steeply from 300 m, to 300 over a short distance of 50
km. A less pronounced increase in depth also occurs to the
west of Hollams Bird Island. The isobeths therefore run
parallel to the coastline over much of the region, except
between 19 and 16 degrees where they become deflected inshore
associated with the sharp depth changes.^®
The Namibian coast and the sea board eastwards
experienced a strong developed bi-directional wind regime'
with predominating winds blowing seasonally from opposing
quarters. The summer dry season is the windiest season of the
year particularly in December and January "with an average
wind of a velocity of 24 km. per hour".=^^ The strongest
onshore wind on the west coast occur at the hottest and
driest time of the day, particularly in summer when the
pressure gradients are strong, providing optional dune
forming conditions.^™
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Sea ports (Namibian Ports)
The only natural harbours on the Namibian coast are at
Walvis Bay and Luderitz. Other bays like the Swakopmund and
Moeve Bay in the north about 400 km. from Outdo may offer
little natural protection advantages but could be considered
for future use if the need arises.
(i> Walvis Bay
The port of Walvis Bay which is located approximately in
the middle of Namibia's coastal line, due west of Windhoek is
the only deep seaport for Namibia. The harbour is formed by a
low lying sand peninsula leading to a pelican point at the
entrance to the bay. The harbour is approximately nine
kilometers wide at the entrance and 12 kilometers long.-^"^
The south half of the harbour is a very shallow lagoon. The
water depth at the entrance to the harbour is twenty meters
and the approaches to the port are maintained through dredged
channels. Commercial whalves at the port seems to be well
protected by the natural harbour but there might be a danger
to fishing whalves at the north-east of the commercial
whalves. Due to the fact that they are exposed to the danger
of swell, small break waters have been constructed to protect
some of these whalves from sea swells.^®
The port can handle both mini — and full size containers
and has cranes for handling loose freight. It handles about
900 vessels and 740 000 tonnes of cargo per year. The dolphin
type tanker jetty can take vessels with a length between
128-129 m. with 20 - 30 000 cargo capacity. Fuel is pumped
into a large storage tank at the port.^*^
The status of Walvis Bay is unclear due to the colonial
history of the country. At the moment the port is under SouthAfrican Authority. South Africa claims the ownership to the
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enclave and other 12 islands (the Penguins Islands) all in
all totals 112 square kilometers. Apart from her claim over
the port and enclave surrounding areas and the above referred
islands, she claims for 200 nautical miles fishing zones in
the waters extending from Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands,
which constitutes about 14% of the Namibian offshore waters
within the 200 miles limits (EEZ)
See Figures 1, 5.1 and
5.2 on the claimed EEZ and port lay out respectively.
In order to avoid confusion and misunderstandings,
readers are being advised to view Walvis Bay as an integral
part of Namibia as it has been clearly stipulated in the
Namibian constitution. Article 1 (4) and the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 432 of 1978.
<ii> Luderitz
The port of Luderitz is located 400 kilometers south of
the Walvis Bay and 250 kilometers north of the southern •
boarder of Namibia. The coastal line in this area is
described as "general rocky, with low hills leading straight
down to the sea"

Several islands which are being claimed

by the South African Authorities viz. the Seal Island,
Penguin Island and Halifax Island are within the ares of
Luderitz. These are the islands which supports the breeding
colonies of both sea birds and seals along the Namibian
coast.
Unlike the port of Walvis Bay, the commercial harbour
and the jetty at Luderitz are fairly protected from the swell
by the Shark Island. See figures 5.3 and 5.4 in the
appendixes section for detailed information on the location
of the port. Although the port is fairly protected "heavy
swells from the Northern-western can cause problems to
vessels mooring at the jetty"
The mooring length at the
harbour is about 220 m. and the water depth at the anchorage
in the Luderitz harbour (between Angra Point and the Shark
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Island) is about 7.5 m. The depth within Mania Creek is less
than 3m. so a dredged channel has been formed to provide for
access to the jetty. This dredged channel is about 6.1 m.
even though some siltation has been experienced for some
time
The port area is fairly confined, being bounded by the
road and town. An area of about 4000 square meters is
available at the head of the jetty. The above referred space
is being used for rail sidings. There are two small oil tanks
at the port and another one which is connected to the jetty
by a 4-5 inch pipeline. The total oil storage capacity is
about 1,600 cubic
(ii} Swakopmund
Apart from the Walvis Bay and the Luderitz ports, the
port of Swakopmund has been suggested as another alternative
to Walvis Bay. The Swakopmund port was used during the
Germans colonial period in Namibia. Big vessels were using
lighters one for that purpose. It seems the port has some
disadvantages to the sea going vessels. It too exposed to the
sea and lacks a holding anchorage such as the one at Walvis
Bay.
<D) Shipping and Sea Transport
Shipping never being administered in Namibia. All
maritime activities were administered by and are still
controlled from South Africa. No doubt the administration of
such field by or though foreign administration South Africa
in this case has a major impact to the integrity and law
enforcement. The status of Walvis Bay, have great impact to
the enforcement of Namibian oil pollution laws.
Walvis Bay, the only deep sea port, handles about 98% of
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all seaborne traffic in Namibia. Its capacity, which was
referred to on page 10 above, was estimated to have consisted
of about 750 000 tonnes of petroleum products in 1980.®^ The
port is served by the Southern African and European Container
Service (SAECS) a consortium of South African and West
European shipping line on a regular liner basis. Liner
container services between Walvis Bay, Luderitz and the South
African ports are being provided by the UNICORN Liner
container service. Other services are in the form of coastal
tramping (charter) operations between the Namibian ports
themselves and Namibia and South African ports. The port of
Luderitz is being operated by the Trans Namib Ltd. (T.N.L.),
a Company which can provide all maritime services at the port
and lights along the coastal line with an exception of Walvis
Bay
Apart from the newly created fishing companies with few
fishing boats, there is no Namibian shipping company in
existence today. The number of fishing vessels in the
Namibian waters is increasing. The establishment of Namibian
fishing companies and the presence of contracted foreign
fishing boats led to such an increase. During the first week
of January 1992 alone, the Port Captain of Walvis Bay
indicated that there were about 30 fishing boats anchored at
Walvis Bay. Therefore, the possibilities of oil pollution
from fishing vessels could not be ruled out as some of them
are large enough to generate oil spills during their
operations and other related functions. Cargo vessels and oil
exploration currently under way may pose threat to the marine
environment. Although there is no oil pollution has been
reported along the coast, the possibilities for oil pollution
from the vessels and other ports' activities such as small
ship yard and container terminals at the port of Walvis Bay
for example could not be ruled out.
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(C> Sea Resources

(i) Fisheries
The Namibian sea has been described as having an
exceptional high biological productivity because of the
upwelling of nutrients resulting from the Benguela Current,
which flows northwards along the coast. The estimation is
that if proper management of the Benguela species is done,
its production could amount up to 3 million tonnes per year
and half of this resource is expected to occur in Namibian
waters. As with other coastal upwelling system, the Benguela
current is dominated by fish species which can utilize the
rich plankton production in the upper water layers.'""®
The fisheries sector in Namibia is divided into two
industries
- the inshore pelagic fisheries using the Namibian based
purse-seine net fleets, and
- an offshore demeshal (bottom) fishery previously conducted
by foreigner trawl fleets and now conducted by
state owned fleets.
The offshore fishery was dominated by the ex-Soviet
Union, other former East European Countries and Spanish ships
which caught hakes, sole, snoek (horse mackerel) and a
variety of other pelagic (surface) and demetal fish. These
fleets froz the catch on board and returned back to their
home countries for processing. The stock of hake has suffered
a great deal from over exploitation over the years. It is
being estimated to be at one third of its former level.
Horse Mackerel has become the main target for the state owned
fleets nowadays.
The inshore fisheries which include pilchard, anchovy,
maasbanker (Sardine) and rock lobster or clay fish was
dominated by the South Africans at the ports of Walvis Bay
and Luder itzThe two ports provide proper fishing
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harbours as well. There are no other places around the coast
whereby fishing is permanently undertaken or combined with
other agricultural activities as the coast is semi-desert
along its entire length. Walvis Bay is the main fishing
harbour where most fish processing industries and services
facilities are also located. It serves all the need of
locally based fishing fleets operating in that area. The
fishing harbour at Luderitz served mainly as rock loberster
fisheries but the establishment of the Pescanova factory at
Luderitz in 1991, which processes white fish, may change the
trend .
<ii) Seals and Sea Birds
Seals and seabirds are abundant in the inshore area of
the Namibian sea, especially al ong the southern coast.A
seal reserve is to be found nor th of the Henties Bay in the
Cape Cross area. The sealing co lony has been culled for pelts
for more than two hundred years . Despite the cruel manner in
which the culling v/as conducted , the number of seals in the
Namibian waters has been expand ed over the last three
decades. The number of seals at the Cape Cross Seal Colony
was estimated at about 90 000 i n 1991-2.-“'^ In the 20th
century, yearing seal pups were regularly exploited with a
production of up to 55 000 pelt s per annum. Small numbers of
bulls has been also killed for their skins.
The population of the bird colonies, which had been
producing quano on the man-made platforms between Walvis Bay
and the Cape Cross for over a c entury, have been reduced as
these birds depended on pelagic fish stock. The quano harvest
at the bird colony is being cul tivated annually or biannually
with a harvest of 4000 to 5000 tonnes per year
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( iii). Sea Weed
Sea weed is one of the marketable marine resources in
Namibia. Currently the sea weed harvest is very low and the
manner in which it takes place could be considered to be
harmless to the marine environment because it is swept up
onto the shore and then collected for industrial purposes.

(D). Oil and Gas
The Namibian petroleum prospecting history started only
in the 1960's and 1970's when a number of foreign companies
were leased for the purpose. The first onshore prospecting
Grant was awarded to the Etosha Petroleum Company in 1959 to
explore an area of 248 400 000 hectors ranging from the
Atlantic Ocean to Namibian borders with Angola, Botswana and
Zambia. The exploration was hampered by the political
situation which has surround the country for all those years.
On this ground the Etosha Company was forced to withdraw from
the offer and the contract was leased to the Taiwan Overseas
Petroleum Investment Corporation (TOPIC
Sporadic exploration for gas was done some years ago.
"In the early seventies, the United States company Chevron
discovered the Kudu offshore gas field. The discovery was
made approximately 120 kilometers off the mouth of river
Orange, which forms Namibia's southern border with S.A.
and just 2.8 km. inside Namibian territorial waters
.
In
1973 the Kudu 9A-1 v/ell was drilled and capped in 1974 then
Chevron left the area. No reason given to its withdrawal
however, it seems to be that political pressure was put this
company to withdraw. Its withdrawal coincided with the
adoption of Decree Number One for the protection of the
territory's natural resources by the UN Council for
Namibia on 27 September 1974."-'^'^
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A United Nations Mandate in 1976 voided all concessions
granted to foreign companies by the South African government.
This resulted in a ten - year period without further oil
exploration till 1987 and 1988 when two more wells were
drilled for the South West Africa Oil Company (SWAKOF)
superseded by NAMCOR. The offshore area out to the 1000 m.
and the isobeth is about 240 square kilometers. The offshore
blocks fall into four main areas
- the Namibe Basin to the north of Walvis Bay ridge
bordering Angola,
- the Walvis and Luderitz Basins in the middle and
- the Orange Basin shared with S.A. They are clearly
indicated in Figure No 2 in the appendixes.
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2.0 Oil As Source Of Marine Pollution
Not only that Namibia was the last colony in the world
history. But the country had been subjected to a system which
resulted in physical abuse of its resources including those
of the marine environment. Namibians had been denied their
right to education especially in the field of science and
mathematics and systemah ical ly cut off froia the entire world
for not allowed to participate in international fora.^
This chapter seeks to provide basic scientific
information on oil pollution and efforts by the international
organizations such as the IMO in dealing with oil pollution.
These will serve as basis for the formulation and
implementation of national oil contingency plan.
The danger of marine pollution from oil activities being
out in Namibia and the none-ratification of international
conventions by Namibia are the main focus of this chapter.
The latter receive more attention from this section.
Sub-sections 2.4 of this chapter, 3.1.2 and 3.2.3 of chapter
three pay more attention to this problem. The general
information given under 2.4 are of more important to law
makers and oil contingency planners. The tv/o groups are the
key players in national oil contingency planning. The
sub-section covered major aspects which need to be considered
during the preparation of contingency plan.
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2.1 SOURCES
Not all amount of oil entering the sea is harmful to the
marine environment. The impacts of oil from natural seeps for
example may not pose any threat to he marine environment.
The presence of this oil in the marine environment could be
in the dissolved or adsorbed form therefore, no visible
impact on the water surface. This does not imply that
physical appearance of oil above the waters has strong impact
to the marine environment. The impact of oil pollution on the
marine environment is determined by different factors as
provided in sub-sections 2.2.0 and 2.30 bellow.
It is the human interventions in the sea which lend to
the degradation of the marine environment. The
transportation of crude oil has drastically increased the
amount of oil entering the sea today. The chemicals and other
toxic introduced to oil products during productions and
refineries are the major threats to the marine resources.
Even though the release of crude oil in to the marine sea
have a visible impact, its biological effects to the marine
environment is lower than that of refined products.^"
2.1.1

Spillage From Ships

Both tanker, general cargo ships and fishing boats can
cause pollution to the marine environment. Oil spill from
ships can be divided into two categories namely, operational
and accidental. According to IMO operational pollution from
ships constitutes the majority of oil pollution from ships.
Oil tankers are the main sources of this type of pollution as
they discharge ballast waters and oil resides from their
cargo tanks. In the paper presented by Mr. Sasamura, an
consultant) to the Law of The Sea. Conference in
Malmo, Sweden spills from ships machinery rooms was listed
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number four i.e. it was second to tanker accidents in 1990
which shows the danger of such a source to the marine
environment. This oil is usual purposely discharged or
resulted from non working oil monitoring equipment.
Tanker accidents occurs in case fire, collision,
stc. Tanker accidents often cause very severe
damage to the local marine environment. This damage depends
mainly on the size of a particular tanker and the nature of
oil involved.

It should be understood that some accidents

are preventable while others are not. The preventive methods
may include education and training and other regulative
measures v/hich could be achieved in both short and long run.
2.1.2

Spillage From Oil Drilling At Sea

Offshore oil operation may cause contihUQUsly spills iii
few amount results from the separation of water from the
recovered oil, disposal of drilled mud and even after
cleaning of equipment. But oil well blow-out may result in a
tremendous oil spill of a catastrophic nature. In its
publication "OUR ASSIGNMENT" the Norwegian Oil Control State
Department a blow-out of a production plat form may result in
a discharge of more than 20 000 tonnes of oil per day.'”’
Reservoir water from the offshore platforms which is
produced with oil contains dissolved oil components might be
discharged at sea as well and cause further damage to the
environment. Experience from the North Sea has shown that the
amount of produced water increases during the life time of
the oil field and the total of oil discharged into the sea
peaks as production continues. The total discharoes of oil
from offshore oil and gas operation in the North Sea peaked
from 1981 to 1985 and still is expected to peak around the
mid 1990 s. •• An increases or decreases of such a spill
depends on the levels of production and drilling activities.
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While oil drilling pollution is among the least types of
sources of marine environment, its potential danger to the
marine environment is very high. As the amount of oil being
released into the sea from drilling operation can increase
during the life span of the drilling plant, Namibia should
prepare to meet such a challenge in carrying out its offshore
drilling operation. The absence of a global legal regime on
this field is a major disadvantage for the Namibian
regulatory authorities. Efforts had been initiated for
international conventions but never being materialized. The
Convention for Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
Resulting from Exploration for and Exp-loi tat ion of Sea bed
Minerals, London 1977 was one the above referred instruments.
Instead, countries entered in bi-lateral or multi-lateral
cooperations for mutual assistance. It is therefore essential
for Namibia to be fully prepared about this crucial issue.
2.1.3.

Spills from Damaged or Corroded Sea Bed Pipeline

No safe havens in all activities to which human beings
are involved. Wherever oil pipelines are, there is a
possibility of oil spills. Pipe lines at sea are exposed to
dangers of one kind or the other. Blow-out and Pipe ruptures
at sea are some of the Gs.uses of such problems but corroded
pipeline is eminent in this field therefore, who ever might
be involved in such activities should have an emergence
contingency plan.
This can involve any kind of oil from platforms to shore
and or fuel from refineries, piping systems for bunkering and
so on. Handling of oil at ports and terfflinals fOhSt 1 fctttb’S a
great danger of such type of oil spill.
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2.2.0. Fate and Effects of Oil On Marine Environment
The sight of oil on the water is visual and common to
all people. Crude oil and petroleum distillate products
introduced to the marine environment are immediately subject
to a variety of physical and chemical as well as biological
changes. The behavior of a large crude oil slick at sea is
more difficult to understand at first. It has been observed
that the moment “crude oil touches the water part of its
higher components spreads out very rapidly and produces a
flash slick which may cover a substantial area’’.''-^

But

heavier components of the same spill spread out more slowly
and are more difficult to fall apart without pressure of
strong wind and waves. Strong winds and waves may break the
slick into small droplets and start to be dissolved into the
sea. The most important factor in the weathering process
during the first 48 hours of the spills is evaporation.
During this process, "low to medium weight crude oil
components with low boiling points volatilised into the
atmosphere".^
Light oil such as fuel oil, gasoline etc. evaporate at a
rate which depends on weather -conditions but all could
disappear within 12 to 24 hours after the spill takes place."''
The main components of the oil may partially dissolved into
the sea but as they tend to be toxic, they may have adverse
effects on plankton or fish in the affected area. Some
component of light oil components are toxic to various marine
organisms and their impacts on the marine environment is
greater than those of the crude or heavy oil.
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2.2.1. Oil Effects On Marine Resources
As mentioned above, oil spill has different impacts to
different marine resources. An impact assessment of an oil
spill depends on the location, amount of the spill and the
affected resources.*'®
On living resources, fish species and sea birds seem to
be vulnerable than seals to any oil spill into the marine
environment. Oil spill could cause death to fish, contaminate
some by accumulating oil droplets and reduce their
productivities. Sea birds are directly or indirectly affected
by oil spill. Young ones are mostly affected than the older
ones. It is self evident that floating oil slicks cause
losses of bird, but the level of mortalities depends also
upon the location of spill and the seasons. Even if the spill
is so small it may kill many bird especially the younger
ones. Tanker accidents are major threats to sea birds as
birds are sensitive te ahy bil
circumstances, even when small amount of oil have been
spilled, may cause mass mortalities.
The effects of oil spill to the marine environment
differ from one another, different organisms at different
places react differently to oil pollution. Individual within
a species may differ, eggs, lalvae, and newly molted
individuals may have different sensitivities to the same
level of pollution. See the summaries in the appendixes,
tables 50.5 and 50.6 on the effects of oil in some major
ecosystems and the proposed environmental classification in
order of increasing vulnerability to oil spill damage,
respectively.
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2.3.0

Factors That Determine The Severity Of The
Ecological Impact

The effect that an oil spill may have on marine life may
vary from one spill to the other as contributory factors
referred above differ as well. Factors below are considered
to be the major determinants of the biological damage of an
oil spill to the marine environment. Summaries of effects of
oil in some major ecosystems and the proposed environmental
claesifieation in order of inereaging vulnerability to oil
damage are being provided in tables 50.5 and 50.6
respectively. See the above referred tables in the appendiK:

2.3.1

Dosage and Types Of Oil
f

The size of spill at a certain area is primarily
determined by the quantity of oil spilt. Although crude oil
has less effect to the marine enyironment, in comparable to
that of refined products, its effects lasts longer than that
of light and refined products.”^ Crude oil consists a mixture
of vast number of individual organic chemicals which vary in
nature. Generally the ehemicalg of crude oil are in tv/o
types, the lighter ones which considered to be quite toxic
and heavy resides which are comparatively inert. The large
•the spill the more effects it has to the environment.
2.3.2

Duration Of EIxposure

The longer the spill exposed to the weather the less
toxic or harmful they are to the marine environment.
Scientific research has shown that, A large crude oil spill
exposed to open sea weather for more than 24 hours for
example, may have less effect to the marine environment

22

simple because the lighter oil and more soluble compounds
which are toxic, are removed and degraded early in the
weathering process. Such a spill may have less biological
impact to the environment.^-^
2.3.3. Location and Natural Environmental Stress
The climatic conditions and the location of a spill have
influence to the ecological impacts by both crude and light
oil spills.The two factors are directly linked to 2.3.2.
above. One may imagine spill which involves crude or heavy
oil in the high seas and along the coastal line and asses
their impacts. The effect of oil spill in the cold
environment might be much more serious and lasting than that
in the more temperate areas. The location is also important ,
in terms of the physical or physiographic energy of the area.
A spill which takes place at the low energy marshy area and
other sensitive areas seems to have more impact to the marine
environment than the one on high energy rocky coastline.
No doubt that oceanographic and•meteorological factors
such as wind conditions and currents in the spill have direct
impact to a particular spill. A combination of heavy wind and
currents' action may break the spill into small droplets and
spread it around the large area which may reduce it's &evef-e
impact to the marine environment.^-® But the negative impact
of these facictrs shcaild not be under estimated. Heavy waves
and wind can also move oil ashore and other sensitive areas
very quickly than expected and may disrupt the cleaning
operation. This may not only interrupt the clean up process
but may led to failure of the clean-up equipments such as
booms during the operation.
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2.3.4. Clean-up Impacts

A long lasting damage to the marine environment ashore
and along the coast could be increased by improper methods of
cleaning up the spill. Different places require different
cleaning methods and techniques which can be determined
through scientific study of those places before actual spill.
Mechanical clean up methods should be properly applied
according to the nature of a particular area. Mechanical
cleaning at other areas such as the salt pans (marsh) and
other special areas could be avoided and preventive measures
being introduced instead. Where preventive measures failed,
the "let alone" method could be considered for sensitive
areas.Clean-up guidelines for different oil products are
being provided in Figures 3(a), 3(b)'and 3(c) of the
appendixes.
2.4.0. International Efforts

In Oil Pollution

Control

Having recognized the importance of shipping and its
potentiality for oil pollution, international organizations
such as the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) and International Maritime Organization
(IMO) were formed to regulate such activities. The IMCO which
was super superseded by IMO in 1959 laid the foundation for
the oil pollution prevention by adopting the International
Convention for The Prevention of Pollution Of The Sea By oil
(OILPOL.1954).
The IMO is a recognized international organization in
the maritime field. Its main objectives are safety and
pollution prevention.
Upon those two objectives which
seems to be broad in scopes various international
conventions, codes and regulations or guidelines were
developed. IMO instruments are dealing v/ith marine pollution
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in different areas. Some of them are too general while others
are more technical and strict to all its members. It should
be noted that those fall under (a) are mainly for safety of
vessels rather than addressing oil pollution in particular.
Their relevance to oil pollution lays on the preventive side.
Fewer vessel accidents results in fewer pollution incidents.
Following below are those which deal with pollution arranged
according to areas of their subject matters;
<a>

Prevention Of

Accidental Pollution

- International Convention On Load Lines of 1966 and
- Convention On The International Regulations for
Preventing Collision At Sea (COLREQ. 1972);
<b) Preventing of Marine Pollution
- International Convention Relating To Intervention On
The On The High Seas In case Of Oil Pollution
casualties (CSI 1969)
- Convention On Prevention Of Marine Pollution By
Dumping (L.D.C." 1972),
- International Convention For The Prevention of
Pollution From Ships (MARPOL 1973/78),
- International Convention For The Safety Of Life At
Sea (SOLAS 1974/78) and
- International Convention On Oil Pollution Preparedness
Response and Co-operation (OPRC 1990)
(c> Liability And Compensation
- International Convention On Civil Liability For Oil
Damage (CLC 1969 and Protocol 1984) and
- International Convention On The Establishment Of An
International Fund For Compensation For Oil
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Pollution Damage (I F C 1971)
This arrangement shows also the relations between these
instruments within their areas of responsibilities and other
areas. Those which are directly dealing with oil pollution
are briefly discussed in the following pages. Their
interrelation should be traced from IMCO's work.
1. Convention For The Prevention Of Pollution Of The Sea
By Oil (OILPOL 1954)
The OILPOL was the first international convention to
deal specifically with the problem of oil pollution at sea.
The convention was designed to minimize oil discharges from
routine ship operations by controlling the pumping of oily
mixtures from bilges and tanks washings. It did not take
accidental pollution into account. This convention was narrow y
in its scope. With exception of tankers, the convention
applied only to ships of registered in contracting states and
was only addressed to persistent oil. It undergone so many
amendments till over taken by MARPOL.
2. MARPOL 1973/78
MARPOL superseded the OILPOL. as amended in 1969 and
1971. MARPOL is the most important convention which deals
with both operational and accidental pollution from ships.
It come about as a result of international concerns about the
global environment including the ever increasing volumes of
oil entering the sea especially the Mediterranean Sea. It
could be viewed as an international response to the Torrey
Canyon accident in 1967. The convention was adopted in 1973
and strengthened by the 1978 protocol. Since the convention
consists of five annexes and a number of regulations, our
concern here is annex one which deals with oil pollution.
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Both Annexes one and two are mandatory to the contracting
states.
MARPOL which is new in its nature in comparison to
OILPOL. covers all the technical aspects of the pollution
from ships. The convention applied to ships of all types
including hydrofoils, boats air cushion vehicles submerse
sable, floating crafts and fixed or floating platforms
operating in the marine environment. Indirect pollution
resulted out of the exploration and exploitation of the sea
minerals is out of its scope. It does not address the land
generated wastes dumped into the sea as this has been dealt
with by the LDC 1972.
Annex 1 of the convention introduced more strict
requirement such as the control of oil discharge from oil
tankers and machinery spaces of all ships, requirements for
the construction of ships to control accidental and
operational discharges of oil. The discharge of oil mixtures
with oil contents of 15 ppm or above from an oil tanker is
prohibited except when all of the following are fulfilled;
- The tanker is proceeding en rout;
- The instantaneous rate of discharge of oil content
does not exceed 60 liters per nautical mile;
- The total quantity of oil discharged on the ballast
voyage exceed l/30~000 of the quantity of the oil
carried in previous voyage for new tankers or 1/15-000
for the existing tankers;
- The tanker is more than 50 miles from the nearest land
and
- The tanker has in operation an oil discharge
monitoring and control system and slop tank.
The discharge of effluent with oil content of 150 ppm
or above from machinery space of the all ships is
prohibited except when all of the following conditions
are satisfied.
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- The ship is proceeding en route;
- the oil content of the effluent is less than 100 ppiOt
- The ship is more than 12 nautical miles from the
nearest land and
- the ship has in operation an oil discharge monitoring
and control system, oily water separating equipment or
filtering equipments.
Such an amount is to be reduced if the current amendment
to Annex 1. Came into force on 6, July 1993. The amendment
provides for the allowable amount in the first category to be
reduced to 30 liters per nautical mile and 15 ppm for the
latter.
The convention requires that waters which can not be
discharged in accordance with the above provisions should be
retained on board and discharged to reception facilities
onshore. All states part to the convention are required to
have enough reception facilities at their ports and terminals
for receiving such waters and oil sludge.
The construction and equipment requirements introduced
by MARPOL are mainly for the reduction or controlling the
operational and accidental oil pollution. Requirement for new
tankers which were designed to keep a tanker afloat in the
case of collision and stranding are also likely to be taken
over by the double hull and equivalent designs requirements
under the convention.
The measures for preventing and controlling operational
and accidental pollution from ships are effectively' dealt
with by MAE^OL. This has resulted into a tremendous,decrease
of amount of oil spilled from ship by 60% from 1981 to
1990.The implementation of the convention is left in the
hands of the contracting states to ensure its success. Some
countries like the European countries have adopted a common
approach to implement such a convention. They have introduced
a Memorandum Of Understanding <M0U) for state control system
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as required by the convention to ensure an effective
implement of the convention requirements.
3.' Intervention For Oil Pollution 1969
This convention is designed to allow the coastal state
to intervene in case of a vessel in distress. It is mainly
for the life serving and pollution control purposes.
4. Civil Liability

Convention 1969/76/84

The Civil Liability Convention came into being as a
result of the Torrey Cannyon incidents in 1967 off the coast
of England. The incident alarmed the international
communities and forced them to thing of solutions to two
major problems experienced by then. These includes, the
identification of specific measures to be taken by a coastal
state against a foreign tanker in trouble outside its
territorial sea, which may threatening to damage to its
coastal and related interests. And the problem concerned
international liability and compensation which deemed to be
t

insufficient by then. It was after the adoption of the
convention in 1976 the basic structure for the current
liability and compensation was formed.
The CLC convention applies to, oil pollution damage
resulting from spill of laden tankers and suffered in the
territorial waters of the contracting states. Damage caused
by other oil spills including those from none persistent oil
(gasoline, light diesel oil, krosene) etc. other than laden
tankers are not covered by the CLC. Unladen tankers and
offshore plants are not covered by the CLC as well. The CLC
does not address any of the preventive measures to be taken
before actual clean spill took place.
Major issues related to ship owners liabilities.
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limitation of liabilities and compensation insurance as well
as the court to which the actions for compensation are to be
brought is laid down in the CLC.

5. International Fund convention 1971 - 76/64 protocols
The Fund Convention is an off-shot of the CLC. It came
in to being as a result of in adequacy of the CLC provisions
in administering its compensation to the victims of the oil
pollution damage. The 1971 Fund as it is usually referred to
led to the creation of an international fund lOPC in October
1978 to supplement the compensation payable under the CLC.
Only those states which are parties to the CLC can
become members of the Fund. The fund provides for, the
supplementary compensation to those who can not obtain full
and adequate compensation for oil pollution in damage under
the CLC and to indemnity under the CLC. The fund provides
that "if shipowner are not liable, or where they are liable
but can not meet their liabilities the fund pays full
compensation due, up to prescribed maximum".^®
The fund is financed by the persons who receiver more
than 150 000 tones of crude and heavy oil in bulk. These
persons are mainly oil companies of the member states. Like
other international laws the fund enforcement is left in the
hands of contracting states and their local administrations
who are entrusted with the task of incorporating the
convention into their national laws which will enable their
local courts and administration to apply the convention
provisions provisions.
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6. International Convention For Oil Pollution Preparedness
Response And Co-operation (O.P.R.C. 1990)
The O.P.R.C. provides for a global framework for
international co-operation in combatting major incidents or
threats of the marine pollution by oil. This convention is
one among the few which address oil pollution from the
practical point of view. The convention requires the
establishment of oil pollution emergence plans on ships,
offshore installations at sea, the ports and oil handling
facilities. Further more, it calls for the establishment
of national and regional oil contingency plans. Under the
convention ships are being requested to have detailed
shipboard oil pollution emergency plans mean while the
authorities involved such as the port or harbour authorities,
the ships' masters and so on are required to report without
delay any information regarding an oil spill. Competent
authorities are being requested to take action when the
information is received. The convention requires for the
neighboring states who are likely to be affected by such a
spill to be notified without delay. In case of a serious
incidents the IMO should also be notified according to the
convention.
Apart from the above requirements the convention *
encourages international co-operation at sub-regional,
regional and global levels. These could be in a form of
advisory service or technical and equipment supply at the
request of other parties to the convention. The O.P.R.C.
encourages for the international co-operation in the fields
of research and development and training at all levels in the
field of oil pollution. IMO has been trusted with the
responsibilities to develop a "comprehensive training program
in co-operation with governments, oil and shipping industries
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and have an oil spill combating equipment stock pile
plans" ,
The convention is mainly beneficial international to
developing countries who do not have necessary resources to
deal with major oil spill when occur. The O.P.R.C. is a
straight forward and convenient instrument which suggests
joint actions to be taken in case of an oil spill.

7. United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Sea 1982
(UNCLOS 82)
The UNCLOS 82 lays down international rules and
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution of the marine environment from all sources. The
general obligations of states are provided in article 192 of

•
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the UNCLOS 62. Article 211 of part 5 of the convention
addresses pollution from ship sources.
The provisions for the enforcement procedures are
provided in the following articles of the convention:
- for the flag states (art. 217),
- for the port states (art. 218) and
—for the coastal states (art. 21 1(f), 194 3(b) and 220)
Article 219 and 221 of section 6 are related to issues
of sea wealthness of the vessels and measures to be taken in
order to avoid pollution arising from marine casualties. The
responsibilities and liabilities of states to protection and
preservation the marine environment are clearly stipulated in
article 235 of Section 9.
Even though the convention is not yet in force, its
principles are widely accepted and used world wide. UNCLOS is
a comprehensive document covers ail aspects of marine
environment including the manner in which marine resources to —
be exploited and preserved.
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The Case Of Namibia

As mentioned in the introduction, this chapter
focuses on the Namibian situation in depth by explaining
the oil related activities before and after independence.
It explains further the regulatory measures taken against
oil pollution of the marine environment where appropriate.
The information being given in this chapter recapitulate
the ideas laid down under section 2.4.0 above and serves
as basis for the coming proposals and recommendations in
chapters 4 and 5 below. The chapter is divided into two
parts in an attempt to describe events according to their
time of occurrence.
3.1 Before Independence
Oil had always been the strategic and essential
commodity for the survival of the South African illegal
occupation during their regime in Namibia. Over the years,
the South African authority spent large amounts of money
on oil exploration mainly offshore its waters. This
resulted in the discovery of a gas project at Mossel Bay,
the only viable sources of hydrocarbon exploration in the
country.
In the case of Namibia, unlike mining activities
which dated back to the eighteenth century, oil and gas
prospecting started only by the late 50s and 60s. A brief
description of oil and gas prospecting is given in chapter
1 and further explored under 3.2.2 below. Even though S.A.
had great interests in the exploration and exploitation of
the above referred resources, which resulted in the
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discovery of the Kudu gas field in 1974, its efforts were
hampered by external and internal political pressures.*
The withdrawal of Chevron from the area could not be
considered separately from the adoption of Decree no.l by
the United Nations Council For Namibia on 27 September
1974. The Decree states that "No person or entity whether
a body cooperated or unincorporated, may search for,
prospect, explore for, take, extract, mine process,
refine, use, sell, export, or distribute any natural
resources, whether animal or mineral, situated or found to
be situated within the territorial limits of Namibia".^
By adopting such a Decree, the council concerned large
damage caused to the Namibian resources and its eco-system
in an unsustainable manner.
South African interest in the development of the Kudu
gas field was very high in the 1970s and 1980s. The
announcement by the South African authority in 1985 that
it had "given approval for the drilling of more wells in
order to further evaluate the Kudu field"=® proves such
interests. Such an interest could have been strengthened
by many factors. First, it should be understood that up to
14 million tonnes of crude oil per year, at least 70 % of
S.A. need for liquid fuel was imported. Secondly, the
expectation of oil presence in the gas field was very high
and the international political pressure which resulted in
the United Nation mandatory oil embargo against the
apartheid regime changed the tradition way of the oil
importation to both S.A. and Namibia."^
i
South African efforts for oil and gas exploration and
exploitation in Namibia failed. The UN oil embargo
remained in force but South Africa remained the only
source of all fuel needs for Namibia all the years. The
political oil situation forced South Africa to keep all
her alternative oil sources secret as much as possible.
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The Persian golf had been the major source of oil shipped
to S.A. during the UN. mandatory oil embargo, especially
the Emirate of Dubai was singled out for such activities.™
Much of the oil imported to Namibia was either
through S.A. or shipped directly through the port of
Walvis Bay and distributed within the country by roads or
rails. Walvis Bay was believed to handle much of the oil
imported to the Namibia while small amount was transported
by rail or road from South Africa. The Netherlands
Shipping research Bureau estimated that the port handled
about 556,000 tones of petroleum products in 1965 and
450,000 tones of the same products in 1986. An oil storage
tank at Walvis Bay, was believed to have increased its
storage capacity during the years of the 1970's and 1980's
due to the increase of the South African occupation forces
which consumed about 15,750 barrels a day. Civilian oil
consumption in Namibia, which included transport, mining
and fishing processing industry was about 7,700 barrels a
day
The amount of oil handled at the port of Walvis Bay
might have caused damage to the local surrounding. The
type of products imported to Namibia all the years are
those of toxic in nature as described in chapter 2.
Knowingly the magnitudes and severity of damages caused by
light and refined petroleum products especially those
resulted from daily operation, the amount of oil being
handled at port of Walvis Bay is large enough to warrant
research for oil pollution around the port.
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3.1.1

Environmental policy

Environmental policy is inseparable from that of
economics in general. The South African policies in
Namibia were bounded and informed by the political
economics *of apartheid which resulted in the plundering of
the living and none living resources
The South African
policies and actions left the country in dilemma about
environment protection to which oil pollution is part.
These policies might have resulted in a wide range of
physical abuse and damage to the marine environment.
Overfishing -is one of the results of such policies and
actions. Others like marine pollution from mining
activities and minor oil spills from ports and oil
terminals are examples of the non attendant problems.
Neither the South African authority in Pretoria
through its environmental council nor the then Windhoek
Administration assumed environment responsibilities
through out her colonial period in Namibia. The failure
for South Africa to assign and or allocate such important
responsibilities under one of the then 12 departments
created in 1980 is evidence of their negligence concerning
the environment and their interests in the plundering of
the country to non-renewable stages. The marine
environment in Namibia by which much of the activities,
such as port and shipping activities are being controlled
through or by South Africa may continue to suffer the
consequences of its unique maritime laws as described in
the next section. In addition to the South African laws
and legal administrative machineries, the status of Walvis
Bay have great impacts to the Namibian environmental law
enforcement.
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3.1.2

South African Laws and Oil Pollution In Namibia

One may not start looking into oil pollution
legislations without referring to the overall legal
framework of the country during the South African colonial
period. The South African authority categorized its legal
system into two main categories as follows:*^
1. The Acts of the South African Parliament to which
Namibia was bound and
2. Ordinances of the South West Africa Legislative
Assembly which implemented legislations within the area
of competence of the then Windhoek Administration such
as education, municipalities and so on.
Those which fall under the first category is where a
number of important maritime Acts and regulations were
included. They were subdivided further into two sub
categories as follows:
(a) Those pertaining to international affairs, for example
ratification of international conventions, in which
Namibia had no say as a no-sovereign territory and
(b) Those specifically applied uniformly to South Africa
and Namibia.
Such a classification helps to understand the
implications of those laws to Namibia and her future
maritime set up. With an exception of the Territorial
Waters of South West Africa Proclamation of the South
African Administrator in 1979, which intended to extent
the country's territorial waters and EEZ, no other South
African laws governing maritime affairs were in force in
Namibia before independence. The principal South African
statute governing commercial shipping, the Merchant
Shipping Act of 1959, applied to Namibia but was entirely
administered from Pretoria.
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It has oust been indicated in chapters 1 and 3 above
that all maritime activities including the harbour
administration of Walvis Bay are carried out by the South
African authority and the only port left under Namibian
control is Luderitz, which has a limited capacity for
cargo generating and sizes of ships it can accommodate.
South African policy on environmental issues has also been
noted as one of the implications of this subject. Now, the
focus is on one and major element of the subject.
Following below are the South African maritime laws
which address oil pollution and their status of
applicabilities to Namibia.
- The Merchant Shipping Act of 1951 as amended by
several times till the recent one in 1989; The Act
applied to Namibia but was administered directly
from South Africa;
- The Territorial Waters of The South West Africa
Proclamation of 1979, exclusively applied to
Namibia;
- The prevention and Combating of pollution of The
Sea By Oil «Act Of 1981, the Act was administered
from South Africa as well;
- The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1986,
International Convention Relating to the
Intervention on the Seas In the Case of Oil
Pollution Casualties did not apply to Namibia.
South Africa is a signatory to the Load Line
Convention and its Protocol of 1971 and acceded to the
following IMO conventions some of being described already
in chapter 2 section 2.4.0.
- International For the Prevention of Pollution From
Ships (MARPOL 73/78),
. ,
- Convention On International Regulations for
Preventing Collition At Sea (COLREG 72), .

- International Convention on Tonage Measurement of
Ships (TONNAGE 69),
- International Convention for Safe Containers (CSC
72) ,
- Torremolinos International Convention for the
Safety of Fishing Vessels (SFV 77),
- International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watching for Seafarears (STCW
76) ,
- International Convention on maritime Search and
Rescue (SAR 79),
- International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS 74/78),
- International Convention Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage (CLC 69) but not to the FUND Convention
of 71/84.
According to the categories above, all these
conventions are not applicable to Namibia as they fall
under category l.(a) above. The importance of these
conventions is well known to both the South African
authority and the international community. Among them are
those already discussed in chapter 2 of this document. As
being recognized above, full implementation of the above
instruments lays in the hands o,f a particular country
which is required to incorporated them into its national
laws. Being a maritime oriented state Namibia is faced
with the tasks of redressing the colonial errors and
reconstruct its maritime sector, develop and protect the
marine resources in a sustainable way acceptable to its
domestic and the international environment. Without
acceding to some of the above conventions and full control
over its maritime affairs, Namibia's marine environment
will remain at risky.
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3.1.3

Oil Contingency Plan

As there was no marine environmental policy and none
among the Windhoek Departments assigned such
responsibilities, oil pollution in Namibia remained a non
attended matter over the years. But due to the South
African claim over the enclave of Walvis Bay and the 12
mentioned islands, a local contingency plan (Walvis Bay
Contingency Plan) was drawn up as part of the South
African oil contingency plan. This plan seems to be well
organized for the aforesaid areas only. As pollution does
not recognize political boundaries, the ways for extending
this plan to the rest of the Namibian waters. This coastal
contingency plan could be used as reference for the
adoption-or drawing up of local and national oil
contingency plans for Namibia. More importantly the plan
could be used for bi-lateral or regional oil contingency
plan. It could be easily extended to the region or subregion of Southern Africa. If oil is to be found and
exploited its coast, Namibia might have much to benefit
from such arrangement than other countries of the region.
Currently is only the South African Navy has the
capability of carrying out search and rescue and oil spill
response in the region. In August 1991 the South African
Search and Rescue Unit carried put a successful operation
when they rescued all 571 people on board of the Cruise
Oceanos before it sank a day latter off the South African
coast.In April 1992 they carried out air surveillance
over the area where" Katina P" sank off the Mozambican
coast. These are only some among many examples of that
nature. More information on regional co-operation is
provided in chapter 4. part B.
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3.2

After Independence

Namibia is now in her third year of independence. The
first chapter of the paper described the country's
background, and the first part of this chapter covered
most of the relevant aspects related to oil pollution
during the South African colonial period. The new
development which the country has undergone since
independence will now be looked into. This part of the
document may lead to critical analyses and discussions of
the subject and possible conclusions.
Namibia's transitional period could be more difficult
and challenging than that of other African countries which
got their independence in the early 60s, 70s and 80s. The
state and its government are not only faced with domestic
challenges over environmental issues as th& issue is at
high level at international fora. International awareness
of the human actions to the environment is more than an
ordinary Namibian knows. The country which is being faced
with environmental problems ranging from physical
degradation of the.ecosystem to that of the consequences
of the colonial actions may not have a common answer to
such problems. Integrated efforts to insure proper
utilization of both living and non living resource as well
as the concepts of modern technology and clean production
could be among many solutions surrounding this issue.
Marine environment protection in Namibia should not
be left alone. A common approach by the government and the
industry to marine environment protection could be
achieved through scientific research and training of
personnel for such purposes.
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3.2.1

Oil Situation

Except the trial consignment in 1990 of diesel and
petroleum from Angola, the Middle East and Venezuela,
South Africa remained the only source of all petroleum
products to Namibia. In 1990 the Namibian government
adopted a global energy development policy and strategy
for meeting energy needs. The policy is based on the
implications of importing oil through South Africa and the
country's energy potentiality as described above.
This policy is focusing on minimizing reliance on
external energy resources and assume
active role in energy development by
internal energy infrastructure. As a
state-owned oil company is empowered
activities with regards to petroleum

a greater and more
developing an
result, NAMCOR a
to carry out various
operations which

include exploration and exploitation. In 1991 the company
opened up offshore provinces for licensing to which about
20 oil companies were reported as having "obtained seismic
data packages from NAMCOR".
So far only fpur companies have been contracted for
exploration purposes namely, the Norwegian Consortium
consisting of Norwegian-based companies NORSK HYDRO,
STATIAL and SAGA, Ranger Oil Limited the Canadian oil
company which entered into joint ventures with Hardy Oil
and Gas U.K. Limited, SASOL a South African company and
Cheveron a North American/South African Consortium
Consisting of Chevron Overseas and Eangle Energy. Apart
from Cheveron which is awarded a license for an offshore
area south of Luderitz, all are contracted for offshore
areas north of Walvis Bay.^^ Among the designated blocks
are those clearly indicated in Figure No 4. See the
appendix section. The Namibian offshore area which has
been estimated to be big as the "800 North Sea Block" and
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equal to the combined offshore areas of Gabon, Congo,
Zaire and Angola may involve many companies in the years
to come.^^
Apart from the unexplored offshore areas, the
government is now considering the possibilities for
additional seismic and more drilling activities to
determine the actual limits of the Kudu gas field which
was hampered by political tension. The exploration and
exploitation of such resources may not only cause
environmental damages by the manner in which they are to
be carried out, but the great danger lies with the means
by which these resources are to be transported to shore or
final destination. Gas and oil consumption in Namibia is
very low, therefore, such resources may find a suitable
market within the region.in which S.A. is considered the
major partner. Transportation of gas oil to S.A. could be
carried out either by piping to nearby towns and cities or
by ships in case of oil. The potentialities of oil
pollution from such means of transportation as given in
chapter 2 of this paper should be taken into account in
developing such facilities.
Currently there is no oil refinery along the coast.
The one under construction at Usakos is about 400 km. from
the western coast. The possibility for marine pollution
from such project is rare. The same could be said about
other onshore oil related activities. But Particular
attention should be paid to the establishment of reception
facilities at the ports and future oil terminals. The
provisions of facilities for the reception of wastes is a
requirement of all four annexes of MARPOL 73/78. Our
concern is regulation 12 of annex 1.
However, this issue has been a controversial one.
Firstly, their installations are too costly. Secondly, the
wastes discharged should be treated for re-use again in
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the case of oil waste for example. Thirdly, the countries
which installed them already seems to charge un—realistic
fees for their uses. For Namibia where oil is being
expected to be handled in large amount, establishment of
such reception facilities should be the prerequisite.
Without proper arrangements the country will suffer from
illegal discharge of ballast water by oil tankers. Part of
the solution to this problems could be the IMO manual on
the reception facilities currently under consideration.
3.2.3

Namibian Laws And Oil Pollution

Environmental protection has received better
attention since independence. "Namibia is one of the only
five countries in the world to have included environmental
legislation in its constitution" .

While there are only

few Namibian laws which address environmental issues,
their primary sources are provided in by Article 95 <L) of
the constitution which states that "the state shall
actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by
adopting policies aimed at the maintenance of ecosystem,
essential ecological process and biological diversity of
Namibia and utilization of living natural resources on a
sustainable basis for the benefit of all Namibians, both
present and future, in particular, the government shall
provide measures against the dumping or recycling of
foreign nuclear and toxic waste on Namibian territory".^®
In addition to the above provision, is Article 140 (1) of
the Constitution which provides that "all laws which were
in force immediately before the date of independence shall
remain in force until repealed or amended by Act of
Parliament or until they are declared
unconstitutional by a competent court".=^^
Being given the descriptive of the legal instruments
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under which the country went through during the colohial
rule and after independence, one might be in a position of
understanding the implications or conflicting interests
the country is being faced with. It should be noted that
while Article 95 (L) is directed to environmental
protection Article 140 <1) addresses the colonial legacy.
This system has negative impact for the law enforcement in
the country as a whole and the marine environment in
particular.
So far, some amendments have been introduced to some
of the inherited laws for meeting local demands but much
has to be done for them to meet international
requirements. Among the amended laws which deal with oil
pollution is the Prevention And Combating of Pollution of
the Sea By Oil Act No. 6, of 1981. Like other maritime
legislations, the Act was never administered from within
Namibia during the South African colonial era. So it was
amended to redress such a situation and fit the local
situation. What should be noted from the amended Act is
that the content of the Act remains more or less the same
to that of its predecessor. According to the speech to
Parliament by the former Minister of Works, Transport And
Communication, the technicalities of the Act restricted
the amendments‘to specific issues. The only international
convention referred to in the Act is the CLC 1969. No
reference is being made to its amendment of 1976 and 1984
or the FUND Convention and its Protocol which are regarded
as offshoots from the CLC.
Annex 1 of MARPOL to which S.A. is a signatory never
being referred to in this Act. Having amended this Act, is
only a step forward mainly for the administration of local
rules and regulations but fall behind international
standards. Some short falls on non compliance of the South
African laws especially the MARPOL has been noted.
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a.ccording to Mr. Brieckel of the Department of Transport
The South African Institute of Marine Engineering Naval
Architects, "a large tanker can lie 13 miles offshore and
discharge her entire ballast and tank washing effluent
with total impunity provided that the discharge does not
exceed 100 ppm of oil in the mixture."’'^ ■ In such a case,
the provisions of MARPOL described on page 12 of chapter
two are not complied to. MARPOL requires that the tanker
should be en route, oil content must not acceded 15 ppm
and the tanker should be 50 miles away from-the nearest
land.
Should such a situation allowed to continue in
Namibia aS it has been, especially at the stage whereby
tankers are expected to be involved in the transportation
of the above resources, without specific national laws
incorporating international rules regulating such
activities, then Namibia is likely to face serious
problems resulting from these activities.
It should be said that Namibia may incorporate some
of the South African laws on oil pollution prevention and
control in its laws for domestic benefits but acceding to
international conventions directly offers more advantages
than doing it through amending to the South African Laws
which are unique to the international maritime field. It
should be noted that having inherited the South African
colonial system of Legislative Acts, a lot needs to be
done for international compliance.
One of the Acts which address environmental issues is
the Foreign Investment Act of 1990. According to Section
(3) (e) of the Act, "in considering an application for
certificate of Status Investment, the Minister shall have
special regard to the impact of the activities of the
enterprise in which the proposed investment is to be made
is.likely to have on the environment and, where necessary.
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the measures proposed to deal with any adverse
environmental consequences".^® In terms of oil pollution,
the Act is strengthened by the provision of Section 71 of
Petroleum Act. The two Acts are incorporated into a Model
Petroleum Agreement dated May, 1991.
The Model addresses environmental responsibilities of
the Mines and Energy Minister and the companies to be
involved. It provides that any exploring company shall:
"conduct its petroleum operations in the manner likely to
promote the conservation of the natural resources of
Namibia and the protection its environment; employ the
most advanced technologies for the prevention of
environment damage to which its petroleum operations might
contribute and for the minimization of the effect of such

^
•,

on adjoining or neighboring lands, and implement the
proposals contained in its development plan regarding the
prevention of pollution, the treatment of wastes, the.safe f
guarding of the natural resources and the progressive
reclamation and rehabilitation of lands disturbed by
petroleum production" .
Subsequently, »-the Model requires the company to be
involved in the exploration and exploitation of oil and
gas to prepare and submit to the Minister its oil
contingency plan prior to the commencement of the
activities. The Model Could be described as one of the
comprehensive documents addressing oil pollution from its
sources, refineries and productions. It initiates the
cooperation between state and industrial agencies. The
expertise and experiences to be gained from these
industries in terms of oil pollution are of paramount
importance to the government especially in the area of
local expertise development. The experiences of the
contracted companies in oil exploration in other parts of
the world and the government's commitment to environment
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protection might have a positive result in the field.‘of
oil pollution prevention for the marine environment.
However, stiff national laws and regulations should be
enacted to ensure environment protection.
Apart from the above discussed laws and other
international instruments, Namibia is a signatory to the
UNCLOS 1962. Even though the UNCLOS is not yet in force,
its principles are widely used by both members and non
members to the UNCLOS. The convention is one among the
comprehensive international documents
aspects of marine pollution including
to Namibia offers the country a great
protect its marine resources from any

which covers all
oil. Its application
opportunity to
of the above sources

of oil pollution.
Now the government is consideration of acceding to a
regional conventions, the Convention for Co-operation in
the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal
Environment of the West and Central African Region
particularly its protocol concerning Corporation in
Combating Pollution in Case of EmergencyThis could be
a starting point fpr Namibia to have access to
international co-operation for oil pollution and an>
emergency response.
A combination of experiences from other countries in
this field should be utilized as well. There are countries
both developing and developed, with good reputation and
well recognized oil contingency plans from which Namibia
can learn. Among the leading developed countries in oil
pollution prevention and control are: Canada, the U.S.A.,
Norway, the U.K. and France.
Among the developing countries are the following:
Singapore, Venezuela, the Bahamas and Nigeria. Even if the
above mentioned countries have different structures their
approaches*to the subject are common to all. The Nigerian
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experiences could be more relevant for Namibia. Nigeria is
a major oil producing country in Africa. It has
experienced many oil spills for almost 31 years. The
available statistics has shown that, a total of 2, 796 oil
spills were reported between 1976 and 1990 with an
estimated quantity of 2, 105, 393 barrels of oil spilled-^^
The country had no national oil contingency plan till
1990. Instead, individual oil companies' oil response
plans were used to deal with minor spills. The companies
formed up an association for the clean—up of medium or
large spills. Having recognized the needs for national oil
contingency plan, a national committee was appointed and
toured different countries in different parts of the world
to learn from their experiences. In early 1991 the
committee organized a symposium to consider the "basic
input to tl}e national plan, the plan structure, plan
operations and maintenance".^^
The symposium was held in view of founding a national
plan which incorporates both the Nigerian Navy, oil
industries and other relevant government institutions
especially the Federal Environmental Protection Agencies.
Apart from local experts, people from other countries in
the West African region and Europe attended the symposium.
Namibia might have a lot to benefit from the Nigerian
experiences at both bi—lateral and multi-lateral levels as
they all members of the Western and Central African
Cooperation in combating pollution. Experiences on the use
of satellite such as those in Kaduna and Calabar (Nigeria)
could be of special interest for Namibia. This could be
useful to asses the possibilities of establishing the
similar base along its geographical disadvantaged coastal
line for both oil pollution and fishing surveillances. The
move for co-operation between the two countries towards
oil and gas development should not bypass marine
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environmental protection.
The extent to which the expertise of the contracted
companies can be utilized depends on the government's
approach to that end. Conflict of interests between
companies and the state should be avoided. Experience has
shown that companies operating in foreign states might not
fully comply to the laws of operating country. In some
cases they found some lop-holes in the legislations or
they lose confidence in their contracts. Some of these
companies have good reputation for environmental
protection in their home countries, but they might not
willing to comply to the laws of foreign country
especially when they find that their interests are being
threatened. In most cases, laws of the developing
countries are flexible or not stricter than their own
national laws under which they had been operating but they
might not willing to observe them. There should be a
conducive environmental co-operation between the state and
the contracted companies if environment is to be protected
as provided in the previous documents.
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PART A: Preventive Measures
PROPOSED GUIDE FOR FUTURE CONTINGENCY PLAN
An oil contingency plan is an effort to deal with a presumed
oil spill within a particular geographical location at an
unknown time. In the process to develop a national
contingency plan, attention should be paid to many varied
considerations.
The existing situation must be studied in order to
determine the threat probabilities to which the state might
be subjected. If oil is to be explored or* exploited along the
Namibian coast, it is self evident that the country will be
subjected to the environmental risks that result from such
activities. It is therefore the task of the Namibian
government to make a risk assessment and come up with proper
guidelines for oil spill prevention and control. As there is
no data available on previous oil* spills in Namibia,
assumptions based on other countries experience should be
used to evaluate the threat. This initial step will help the
government in drawing up its plan which can be executed with
only slight modifications.
The identification of locations where oil pollution
incidents are likely to occur and where the consequences are
expected to be, is the most vital step in the preparation of
a national oil contingency plan. Preparedness should be
emphasized to prevent or respond to spills. At the sites at
which oil is, or to be, handled in large quantities, such as
tank farms, pipelines, oil terminals and refineries; the
quantities and frequency with which such products are handled
within different places, and the volume of shipping,
especially tankers, and their routes to the Namibian ports
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and oil terminals must be identified.
The sensitive areas such as fish spawning areas, seal
and bird colonies as well as salt pans must be identified.
This combined with an understanding of the oceanographic and
geographic characteristics of the Namibian marine environment
will help the planners to forecast the possible effects and
the environmental impact of an oil spill in the Namibian
waters.
One pf the important roles to be achieved in oil spill
contingency planning is the work and provide for co-operation
among the authorities with overlapping responsibilities. Many
agencies and institutions involved .in marine activities must
be addressed in an effective contingency plan. Currently
there are four government institutions who are directly
involved in sea activities with other institutions to follow
soon. The possibility for marine pollution from these
activities is there.. The general responsibilities of these
institutions in the event of a pollution incident need to be
clearly defined in the plan.
The assignment of responsibilities and the establishment
of lead agencies to c^versee the proper execution of these
responsibilities by the different institutions is an
important function of the contingency plan. The plan must set
tasks for the various institutions with specific assignments
to be carried out during oil spi11. operations, drawing skills
from different sources hat are peculiar to their areas of
expertise and within jurisdictions. Some risk areas of
particular concern are pollution from:
- marine traffic in the Namibian waters and
ports; offshore mooring points (connected to land based
tankage etc); land based transportation or facilities;
spills of unknown origin; and offshore mineral exploration
and exploitation. It is possible that responsibility for
each area could be assigned to different lead agency. But
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for the simplicity of these guides all could be expected to
perform certain tasks under the head of the Ministry of
Works, Transport and Communication.
The drawing up of the national contingency plan should
not only be left solely in the hands of the government as
private institutions have important roles to play in the
development of such a plan. Experience from other countries
has shown that the government alone will not be able to
properly address oil pollution problems. Therefore, joint
efforts by both government and industries have been proposed.
The government of Namibia should must drawing up a plan and
asses responsibilities in terms of resources drawn from
as many different institutions as possible.
The government's task in national oil spill contingency
planning is to ensure that adequate plans and resources
either individually or collectively owned, are available to
counteract any spill around and within the boundaries of the
country. The major government task should be that of co
ordinating different plans to form a national oil contingency
plan. Such a coordination process should be done in such a
way that each individcial institution involved be aware of
their own responsibilities and those of others.
Because many institutions are to be involved in the
implementation of the plan, it should be made simple, clear
and understandable to anyone involved. In order to avoid
confusion on who is responsible for what, the following
points should be taken into account before making any written
plan. There should be a clear-cut but flexible command
structure at both national and local levels. There should be
a well thought out procedure by which all those capable of
making a contribution can rapidly marshal their resources in
an orderly way.
The clear understanding of the situation and proper
consideration of the above factors will enable the Namibian
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government to formulate its policy on oil pollution. Such a
policy which has to define some major terms under which the •
above referred to institutions should perform their duties
should lead to good organizational structures for a national
contingency plan. The plan should clearly stipulate the
responsibilities of each of those to be involved.
1. Organization or InstitutionaJL Arrangement
The marine environment in Namibia is equally important
economically as a number of other economic sectors onshore.
Environmental planning for the marine sector especially in
the area of oil pollution needs to be done by a body of all
those involved in the above referred activities. They could
meet under chairmanship of the National Planning Commission
under the President's office if not a National Eiivironmental
Committee.
As has been indicated already, there are many public
institutions currently involved in marine related activities.
Such a number may double or triple in the event of an oil
spill, depending on the nature of a particular spill.
Allocation of marine environment responsibilities under a
single ministry could offer little advantages. Disasterous or
national catastrophic oil spills may go beyond the capacity
of a national contingency plan whereby international help
should be sought. It is therefore assumed that, the committee
made-up of different institutions should be formed to look
after marine environmental problems including oil spills from
different sources. The committee should draw up plans
including information related to the description of each,
equipment on hand, methods available for oil disposal,
training of site personnel and plan implementation
guideline.
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Due to the fact that government institutions are
generally regarded as a single entity, their proposals on the
subject matter should be compiled in co-operation and should
incorporate local and industrial plans. Together, if properly
organized and co-ordinated, they constitute a national
contingency plan. To achieve this a clear-cut, flexible
commanding structure and a proper procedure for its
implementation is needed.
Below are prosed functions for various institutions in
accordance with the IMO recommendations and the provisions of
Section 29 of the Prevention and Combating of Pollution Qf,
the Sea bv Oi1 Act Of 1991. These responsibilities need to be
assigned before any attempt is made to develop a written
plan. It should be noted that this paper is restricted to
responsibilities rather than the posts to which they are to
be assigned. Non existence of the relevant institutions such
as the Maritime Administration, the Coast Guard or the Navy
to carry out this responsibilities are among the
disadvantages to these proposals.
Namibia is a relatively small country compared to other
maritime countries in the world. Due to the nature of its
coastal line, the country may employ only a two-tier response
structure at national and local levels. The former is the
concern of this paper.
(A). National Elnvironmental Protection Committee ^NEPC)
There should be a National Environmental Protection
Committee for oil contingency planning. The committee should
be comprised of representatives of the ministries who are
involved in the day-to-day activities in the marine
environment, namely:
-The Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication,
-The Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources,
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- The Ministry of Mines and Energy,
- The Ministry of Defence / Navy and or Coast Guard,
-The Ministry of Wildlife, Tourism and Nature Conservation
and others as the need arises.
The committee should be should be invested with power
for the formulation and administration of a national policy
to control oil pollution. The committee's terms of
responsibilities should be extended to planning and co
ordinating response activities for emergencies involving
other harmful substances, and to the protection of the marine
environment in particular.
Concerning the National Oil Contingency plan, the NEPC
should be responsible for taking active leadership in the
identification of coastal natural resources at risk and
available of response resources (skilled and trained
personnel, finance and equipment) for effective control and
plan implementation. It should work in concert with other
institutions both national and international to identify
critical expertise for the co-ordination of response to major
spills and the exchange of information. The NEPC should also
be responsible for nominating and appointing On-Scene
Commander if so deemed. One of its major tasks should be
regular review and amending the plan. It should ensure that
the plan is enjoying mutual support of international, local,
regional and international agreements. The NEPC should also
encourage joint training and exercises for its nationals at
all levels and assess the levels of training needed for
particular courses.
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(B). The Technical Advisory Committee on Oil Spill
Contingency Plan (TAC)
The TAC should be an executive body of the NEPC. The
committee should consist of technical and administrative
members from the previous mentioned ministries. It should be
able to co-opt members from other government ministries as
need arises. Some of the co-opted ministries could be:
- The Ministry of Home Affairs for public security and
immigration purposes;
- The Ministry of Information and Broadcast for media and
information publication;
- The Ministry of Local Government and Housing for the
utilization of municipal facilities and equipment if
necessary and
- The On-Scene Commander (an independent person) as described
under <D) below.*
The committee should be responsible for the following
duties and responsibilities: It should provide technical and
advisory assistance to the NPEC at any time, it should
evaluate all matters rjelated to communications, surveillance
and clean-up equipment; It should provide guidance to local
authorities on the formulation of local plans, mainly by
furnishing them with available information. The TAC should
provide an immediate advisory function for the OnrScene
co-ordinator during oil spill clean up activities.
It could be advisable for the TAC to meet under the
chairmanship of the Ministry of Works, Transport and
Communication which should be the Lead Agency for plan
implementation. The lead agency should be empowered by the
NEPC to take control of the response if he feels, that the
spill requires a National Response Team.
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(C). National Response Team (NRT)
Generally, an oil spill should be classified into two
categories, i.e. minor and major spills, the former is when
the spill released is within the capacity of the company or
local agency responsible for oil spill response. It is
therefore, assumed to be handled and contained at local
levels. In such a situation, the national OSC Team could be
represented to oversee the nation's ability to respond
effectively if the need may arise. The latter is when the
spills are beyond the capacity of the local response team
whereby the national response team might be involved. In this
case the national response team under the control of the
designated officer at a national level (On~Scene Commander)
should always be involved. The involvement of the national
response team should be determined by-the NEPC through the
request of the lead agency.
In the case of a catastrophic oil spill in which
international assistance is to be sought, the agreed
procedures on the means of communication, immigration and
customs duties, accommodation and other related matters
should be followed. Such responsibilities should be carried
out by the Ope.ra-tion Group of the On-Scene Commander Team in
the assistance of the pollution Prevention Department of the
Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication as discussed
under 2. (A) below.
<D). The On-Scene Commander <OSC)
The On-Scene Commander is an official to be designated
by law or competent authority such as the proposed NEPC
and/or the Lead Agency to command and respond to particular
oil spills.

This person should be vested with the authority
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and responsibility of protecting the public interest, and
should be accountable to the Ministry of Works, Transport and
Communication. The port Captain or one of the his senior
staff members with nautical or environmental protection
related background, may be appropriately for the post.
A unified command structure with clear responsibilities
of the three identified bodies namely, the NEPC, the TAC and
the OSC. may ensure an effective response to oil spill in the
Namibian marine environment.
In carrying out his responsibilities the OSC should
employ a structure capable of combining the available
resources and promoting effective communication among the
responders. This structure should be able to meet the
challenge of an oil spill at all levels. Its capacity should
be expanded to meet an escalating situation and accommodate
multiple responding agencies such as joint operation at
national and international levels.
Following below are the proposed groups of the On-Scene
Commander's Team. This structure is also presented on a
diagram on page 68 below.
*

1. Elxecutive Group
An executive group for the On—Scene Commander Team
should consist of: the OSC himself and his deputy, heads of
other groups outlined below and other advisory members of the
TAC to address technical, financial and legal questions.
Such a group should be able to provide the OSC team with an
overall management of oil spill incidents. This body should
be viewed as a decision making body of the On-Scene Commander
Team. It should be responsible for assessing the reported
situation, determine the needed resources and implement the
decision taken.
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2. Operation Group
No oil spill is identical to another. After notification
of an oil spill more information on the spill is needed to
determine the size of the response team. In many cases an
observer could be sent to the scene but in some cases the
number of people to be involved could be pre-determined by
the OSC according to his own Judgement. In the case where the
observer is sent, the nature and quantity of the product
involved could also be used as a determining factor.
The composition of such a group may vary from time to time
but major sections to deal with matters related to operation,
materials, finance and administration of the event are always
to be found in this group.
Initial responsibility of this group should be to
assist in the formulation of a response strategy. This should
include the implementation of shore line protection treatment
and wild life rescue operations. It should include the
co-ordination of response activities that in valves foreign
governments or contractors.
3. Resource Assessment Group
The group should consist of leaders of the
- Resource Assessment or Surveillance Units,
- Site Assessment Unit and
- Documentation Unit.
The group should serve as a mechanism for the provision
of co-ordinated, consolidated and comprehensive environmental
information and advice concerning environmental impacts,
resource sensitivities and other related matters. Such a
group should identify the shore line protection, treatment
priorities, methods for the operation section and liaison
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with the industries as well as assess institutions for
information exchange. The planning group should meet under
the chairmanship of a representative of the Ministry of
Fisheries and Marine Resources. The Ministry of Tourism,
Wildlife and Nature Conservation should provide
representatives to act as co-chairman.
4. EHiblic Affairs Group
The role of the media in an oil spill event should not
be underestimated. The media has a major influence on a large
part, if not the entire population. It is the Public Affairs
Group under the supervision and control of the Lead Agency
which will be charged with co-ordinating the flow of
information from the OSC's team to the media for public
release.
The chairperson of the group should be■responsible for
determining who will act as spokesperson for the Ministry
making contact with public affairs representatives and
agencies or departments establishing basic procedures for
information flow to the public, and maximizing the
co-operation between all parties of the response operation to
develop accurate information for release, and approving each
and every written statement for release to the media.
2. Roles and Responsibilities of Institutions and Support
Agencies Involved
In case of a major oil spill large institutions both
private and public might be involved in such operations.
Although individual private institutions might not have
direct responsibilities over oil spills not resulting from
their activities, they could be called up-on for joint
operations. The industries may play a major role in providing
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equipment whenever the have any available. A major oil spill
may go beyond the national response capacity and external
help resources and expertise are to be required. Such a
situation might be jointly addressed in plan as well. The
provisions of international conventions, as discussed in
Chapter 2, are of great advantages to such a problem.
Following are some of the institutions to be involved in
major oil spills at national local and national levels.
1. Private InstitutionsIndustries such as oil shipping companies, shippers'
associations and other related organizations can play a major
role in oil spill response. These are the bodies which are
directly involved in the day-to-day activities in the sea
areas from the private sector world-wide.
Although the industries (which pose a threat of
pollution to the marine environment) are bound to respond to
any oil spill resulting from their activities, their
responses should be monitored by somebody else. Usually the
Government Agency whicji oversees the industrial activity like
the Ministry of Mines and Energy in the case of oil
exploration and production should take the lead. The Namibian
Petroleum Act dated May 1991, requires the industries to have
their plans ready and employ all practical means to respond
to oil pollution from their sources. These are the plans that
should be incorporated into the national plan. Such
incorporation strengthens the overall response capabilities
of the national plan.
For efficiency of the national plan, the industry should
be given greater chance to contribute to the plan formulation
and implementation if required. It is the industry who will
suffer financially if they proved guilty of polluting the
environment; therefore, their participation in this process
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should be encouraged. Many countries have realized the need
for their governments to promote and develop appropriate
relations with industry in these areas. It should be in the
interest of the Namibian government to have such
relationship. A major benefit perhaps would be to assign the
responsibility for stock-piling response supplies and
equipment to the industries which pose the environmental
risks.
The industries are expected to give the government a
hand in terms of resources in the cases where they are rarely
involved or when additional resources are required to
reinforce the government's response capacity. In such a case,
independent contractors could be made for other oil companies
which might not be involved as ship or oil owners to render
some assistance.
2. Government or Public Institutions

The Namibian government should have duties and
responsibilities to protect the public interests in the event
of any oil spill. For .this purpose, some key government
institutions and possible roles in the event of oil spill
have been identified. It must be understood that some of the
proposed institutions, such as the navy and coast guard, are
not yet in existence in the Namibian government structure.
Their establishment is beyond the scope of this paper. But
including them in the list below is intended to only show
their importance in response to oil spill emergencies.
<A> Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication
As referred above, this ministry should be the lead
agency in the implementation of the national plan. Therp
should be a section or body responsible for oil pollution
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prevention and control within such a Ministry. This section
should be led by a knowledgeable person, or expert in marine
pollution matters. The Pollution Prevention Department should
represent the ministry at any meeting of the TAG.
Among its major responsibilities in case of oil spills
should be: Hiring vessels and crews, including local and
foreign boats; identifying and providing heads of operational
Sections for oil spills where appropriate; providing trained
team leaders and special equipment from all possible sources
for oil spill emergency response purposes, organizing,
supervising and co-ordinating the travel of foreign experts;
monitoring the maintenance of oil spill equipment and
ensuring the conditions of all hired equipment including
vessels and boats at the points of return.
(B) Ministry of Home Affairs
The primary role of this ministry in oil spill response
is immigration and customs clearance of both foreign
responders and spill clean-up equipment. The Ministry of Home
Affairs should coopera'te with the customs officers and the
Pollution Prevention Department of the Ministry of Workers,
Transport and Communication for quick clearance of emergency
equipment. Customs officials need to be notified at an'early
stage of any loaned equipment which could be declared free of
customs duties.
Apart from the above responsibilities, the ministry has
an important role to play in terms of public security and
safety of personnel at the scene. These include the
following: to provide traffic control if necessary and to
control people's movements during the clean-up activities
especially when heavy equipment such as tractors and trucks
are being used; to insure safety of the spectators especial
in the case of flammable and other dangerous substances and
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ensure safety storage for oil spill equipment.
This is one among the few government institutions which
could provide personnel as team leaders in the absence of
special trained units, such as the coast guards and/or the
navy. The police force or other members of security personnel
could easily provide safety than any other ordinary
personnel.
(C> Ministry of Local Government and Housing
In cooperation with the Department of Works (A above),
the local authority or municipalities would be able to
provide shore cleaning equipment and manpower resources. It
is the municipalities who know the location where debris not
contaminated with oil, can be burned or deposited unburned.
All such sites are proposed to be near potential areas along
the coast.
In the case where a clean-up process takes place at a
non municipal area, particular attention should be paid to
further ecological damage likely to be caused by the movement
of people and cars. Oi,i collection and disposals along the
coast which are not identified in local municipalities and
ports, should be done under the supervision and control of a
different institution. The Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and
Nature Conservation could be among the appropriate
institutions for such a purpose. The ministry should be in
charge of identifying the routes and disposal sites. The
impacts of clean-up activities to the ecosystem of the Namib
desert which covers almost the whole coastline should be
critically assessed before the commencement of the operation.
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<D> Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources
The Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources should be
in charge of providing maps or charts for the operation and
advice on scientific matters related to operational
techniques etc. It should work hand in hand with the TAG and
the Ministry of Wildlife, Tourism and Nature Conservation to
ensure that all environmental precaution measuj'es are taken
into account during the clean-up operation.
<E)

Ministry of Defence (Navy or Coast Guard)

The navy and coast guard units are commented for oil
spill response and marine environment protection. Different
coastal states are employing these institutions as permanent
institutions in this field. Apart from the navy which is a
military institution,.the coast guard could be organized
mainly along military or civilian lines as the case in the
U.S.A. and the latter is the case in Canada.
Among the duties they could carry out in Namibia should
the government fipd it important to establish them are
search and rescue activities which could include oil slick
surveillance and monitoring, and full participation in oil
containment and clean-up operations. These institutions could
be utilized for all oil spill related activities from
planning to operations. Proper utilization of their resources
will depend on priorities and operational establishment by
the Namibian government.
Even if the two institutions are commended for such
responsibilities, the navy seems to offer little advantage
over the coast guard. These situation could be found where
two organization could exist but their resources might not be
pooled together for marine spill response purposes. In its
report the Publie Review Panel on Tanker Safetv and Marine
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Soil1 Response Capabi1itv the Canadian Department of National
Defense's capabilities in the area of oil spill response was
reported as extremely limited. The report stated that
"contrary to the public expectations, the Department of
National Defence's capacity in the area of oil spill response
is extremely limited because it does not possess spill
response equipment."^
It is up to the Namibian government therefore, to set up
any such organizations with clear roles and responsibilities
on oil spill response. The Namibian coast guard or naval
forces should be trained in such a way that they should be
able to protect national resources from physical actions such
as illegal fishing and harmful substances such as oil spills.
Joint training and oil spill exercises to be discussed later
in this chapter, should be one of the major tools the
government employs to achieve its objectives of timely
response to oil spills at all levels.
(F) . Miiiistry of Mines and Elnergy
The role of the Mines and Energy Ministry's activities
concerning oil spills could be restricted to spills which may
result from oil drilling and oil production activities in
operation. For these the ministry could serve as the lead
agency. However, the expertise of the ministry should be
utilized at ail levels of oil spill contingency planning.
(G>
Others
Other ministries such as the Ministry of Justice and
Legal Affairs and the Ministry of Finance might not have a
physical role to play in the operation of the spill other
than giving an advisory opinion with respect to their field
of competency.
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Contingency Planning and Emergency Response
Operational spills and illegal discharge of oil into the sea
has been identified as major source of oil which occurs
regularly in the marine environment. Apart from tanker
operations, oil transfer operations during fueling of vessels
possess major and long lasting threats to the environment.
Major, or catastrophic events, such as the Nestucca off
the coast of Washington, the Exxon Valdez in Alaska, and
Amoco Cadiz off the French coast produced extensive visual
evidence of a significantly altered environment that with
visible oil slicks attracted public attention and focused
interest incapability to deal with catastrophic events. But
little attention is being paid to the regular and most
harmful spills which take place around ports and oil
terminals. Loading and unloading of tankers are one of the
major elements of such spills.
Some of the major regular spills in and around ports go
undetected for period's of time resulting in chronic pollution
of localized areas over time. Such a situation should be
properly addressed in Namibia and the above referred case of
Walvis Bay Port where the extent of oil pollution problems
has not yet been determined. This should be looked into
before the commencement of the handling other types of oil at
that port in order to determine the present water qualities.
Data of the first research should be used as a basis for
future research on oil pollution at that port and the
potential for pollution at other terminals to be.
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1. SURVEILLANCE
Surveillance of oil spill is a part to the marine
pollution regulations and law enforcement process. It can be
done in two ways, regularly and after actual spills take
place. Many countries have recognized the former as one of
the effective measures by which polluters are being detected
and convicted. Such a process is provided in almost every
international convention and national law dealing with oil
pollution. Among them are UNCLOS 82 and MARPOL 73/78. Article
192 of the UNCLOS 82 provides for the general obligations of
the state to protect and preserve the environment.
Both articles 56 and 235 of UNCLOS 82 provides such
responsibilities on the coastal state by stating that "states
are responsible for the fulfillment of international
obligations concerning the protection and prevention of the
marine environment."^ Such requirements are also provided in
Paragraph 3 of Regulation 9 of Annex 1 to MARPOL 73/78 which
requires Governments or parties to the convention to
investigate the visible trace of oil whenever observed to the
extent they are reasonable to do so.'®
Different countries have employed different means of
achieving such objectives. The widely used ones are patrol
boats, fixed wing airplanes and helicopter. Air planes fitted
with side-looking radar, infra-red and ultra-violet sceanning
equipment for detection and surveillance of oil at sea.
Today only the surveillance of illegal fishing is being
carried out in Namibia in which patrol boats and hired
aircraft are being used. Oil exploration and exploitation
along the coast may require permanent employment of the above
described means of surveillance. No doubt, such planes and
equipment are costly for the government but they offer more
advantages than patrol vessels in case of spill monitoring.
Not only does air surveillance help to detect and convict the
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polluters but it allows the determination of the location,
movement and extent of the oil spill. Aerial monitoring is
critical to the effectiveness of the On-scene Commander
control and ability to direct counter pollution operations.
To ensure proper protection of its long and rich coast
line, and to improve its current surveillance system, Namibia
should employ some of this equipment. They could be
effectively used if they are to be entrusted under a separate
body or bodies such as the coast guard or the navy with
specific roles for oil spill surveillance.
Preferably, this should be the coast guard, because the
navy is likely to be dominated by military activities rather
than that of environment protection. These institutions could

^

be supported by a satellite centre onshore. The centre could
be jointly run under a surveillance program by the government
and the industry. It should be in the interest of both
fishing and oil companies and the government to set-up such a ^
centre to monitor illegal fishing and oil spills.
The air surveillance program should first focus on areas
where pollution problems from unidentified sources are likely
to be, and then be extended to other areas within the
Namibian waters. The current technological development in
tank design and tight marine safety regulations at the
international level may change the trend whereby tanker
washing might not be a major source of pollution. Therefore,
consideration for oil pollution should be extended to the
increasing number of fishing boats due to the creation of new
companies and the possible increase of other cargo vessels. A
program for oil and gas platform overflights should be
designed and integrated within such plans. In the case where
air surveillance is to be provided. Considerations should be
given to acquisition or hiring of helicopters to observe and
determine the extent of reported oil spills. In the absence
of the helicopters and aircraft, as the case is today, a
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more or less formal agreement should be entered into with an
aviation company.
The extent of which this agreement will depends on
particular needs. Even if company's service is to be needed
only for oil spill monitoring after the spill has been
reported, such arrangement should be provided for in the
contingency plan.

2. Reporting and Sample Taking
The need for oil spill reporting has been recognized
along with the threats caused by pumping overboard of bilge
water and residues from tanker cleaning operations. The issue
has been fairly dealt with at international and national
levels. Reporting of oil spills is among the major
requirements of the International Oil Pollution Preparedness
Response and Co-operation Convention of 1990. Section 3 of
the Prevention and Combating of Pollution of the Sea by Oil
Act of 1991 established these principles for Namibia.
The oil spill contingency plans should identify an
agency to which a particular spill could be reported. The
reporting procedures should be organized in such a way that
any one who observed the spill can easily report it to the
right officer at the right time.
One should understand the fact that ordinary Namibians
who could observe the spill first, might not have access to
interest in, or knowledge of the plan. For these reasons,
both offices' and residential telephone numbers of the above
referred officials should be listed with other national
emergency numbers such as the police, the ambulance and the
fire brigade. Such provision does not overrule the
requirement for these numbers to be included as appendixes in
the plan as required by the IMO guides for oil spill
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contingency plans?.
The NEPC and the Ministry of Works, Transport and
Communication should co-operate in the following areas for
public education about oil pollution:
- the dissemination of information on the
effects of marine spills and spill reporting
procedures and
- the establishment of a system whereby people who file
reports leading to the conviction of an allegedly
polluter may be rewarded.
The government should make it a custom for individuals
to report all oil spills irrespective of the size and
apparent seriousness. But the proof on its legality, nature
and quantities should be left for the pollution prevention
officer (P.P.O.) who will be a member of the On-Scene
Commander Team.
One of the most important part in oil spill reporting
procedure is when information reaches a designated pollution
prevention officer ( P.P.O.) who is required to document the
report in a written form. Usually a printed form is required
wherein all detailed Information is entered. According to the
IMO Resolution MEP 26 (23) this information should include:
- particulars of the ship (polluter's name, type, port
of registry and official number);
- time (date and local time of observation);
- the geographical location of the spill;
- marine meteorological conditions prevailing in area
(wind, waves and temperature);
- the extent of pollution (type and estimated quantity
of oil spilled) and
- other related information (name and address of the
witness, taken or intended action etc). See Schedule
III in the appendix section on the list of possible evidence
on the alleged contravention of the MARPOL 73/78.
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It is provided that the P.P.O. could supplement the
report with relevant information as required by the recipient*,
or deemed appropriate by the one sending it. The supplemented
information should include observation on further
developments of the spill and notification of the states
likely to be affected by the spill. Namibia can easily
benefit from these procedures as they are easily implemented
and simple to follow.

(a)

The roles of On-scene Commander in Oil Reporting
Procedure

The On-Scene Commander who is designated in the
contingency plan, or just appointed by the regulatory agency
at the time the spill is reported, should be charged with the
following responsibilities:
- He should investigate and confirm all the reports,
- advise the person or authority with the polluter's
organization of their liability for containment and
clean-up actioh,
- evaluate various options for containment and clean-up,
and
- convene a meeting for the TAG if necessary to
determine the seriousness of the reported spill, and
initiate appropriate action to contain the spill.
Immediacy of response is crucial. Therefore, the
reporting procedure for a spill, which is likely to affect
other adjacent states, should be clearly provided in the
plan. For effective response to any incident, reporting
through central authorities such as embassies and foreign
ministries of the neighboring states should be avoided by all
possible means. In the case where no joint contingency plan
is in force, special arrangements at local levels should be

made in advance to ensure effective reporting procedures
between the two neighboring states. The chart at the end of
this section illustrates the procedure by~which information
could be channeled during the accident took place.
(b) Sample Taking
Sample taking is one element of investigation procedures
mainly done by the P.P.O. Once the spill is reported, the
P.P.O. is faced with the task to provide evidence that oil
has been illegally discharged and that it was discharged from
the suspected ship. The P.P.O. is required to act quickly in
takinq his samples. In reference to chapter two, 2.3.2 an oil
spill can break apart and start loosing parts of its
components within 24 hours therefore the appropriately time
for sample taking should be the first hours after the spill
occur.
In the case where the suspected polluter has been found,
samples should be taken from any of the potential sources
such as its cargo, ballast, slops, bunkers, bilges lubricants
etc. All these requirte a trained and well informed P.P.O.
about sampling implications. The P.P.O. should deserve
respects of the crew members if it is taken from a certain
vessel. Formal appearance and self presentation of the P.P.O
to the officers of the suspected ship may avoid confrontation
between the crew and the P.P.O.
Apart from the P.P.O. there should be an appropriate
analyst appointed under the laws to which collected samples
are to be taken. When it is not convenient to use the service
of analyst, any other laboratory may be used to obtain
analysis of the sample. But the name of the analyst should be
obtained and recorded as it may be necessary for an
appearance before the court for purposes of cross~
examination.
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In order to avoid the cost of unnecessary analysis when
the accused pleads guilty, oil samples might be stored until
the preliminary hearing. The necessary storage facilities
such as refrigerators to preserve the sample and the lockers
to provide security should be made available. Samples need to
be kept in such a manner that continuity of possession may be
proved. To ensure such a possession, samples should be kept
in a locker from the time of collection, through analysis at
the laboratory and until such time as it is tendered in the
court as evidence. There is a possibility for the Court to
reject that sample if it was not properly accounted for and
testified to.
This testimony is required to establish the identity of
the exhibition i.e. to find out whether it is the same
exhibit and the its condition remains the same. Any change in
quantity or nature of the product should be carefully
observed and accounted for.
The container of a liquid sample must be clearly marked
for the identification by each person who has had custody of
that particular sample at a time. The mark, (usually
initials) should be a'ccompanied by the date on which the
custody was taken, and a designation by letter or number
which will serve to distinguish it ready from others similar
to it. Any such identification marks used must be applied
while the sample is in that person's custody.
The government should make a rule that conveyance of
samples to the laboratory should be done by hand and taken
directly to the analyst. If they are to,be shipped by public
carrier, registered mail or express which provides a record
of transmission and signed receipts signature upon delivery
could be used, but other methods should be avoided. The
carrier should be made aware of the possible contents or
nature of the sample as restrictions on its delivery may
apply. The receipts issued by the carrier to the shipper will
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probably be required as evidence

by the court therefore all

should be account for.
It is essential that all those involved in sample
taking, transportation and analyses, be informed about the
importance of each step in the sampling process. If it is to
be presented before the court, then "the court should be
convinced that the sample in question is indeed that which
the officer took from the place where the offence was
committed and that it has not been manipulated or altered
other than for the purpose of the analyses"^. The government
should be aware of the fact that well organized and informed
state agents should assist the state to convict the alleged
polluter. Nevertheless, there is a possibility for the state
to lose the case and suffer the physical environment and
financial consequences if the P.P.O is not well informed
about this task.
3. Reporting and Actual Clean-up of Oil Spills
#

Prior to the actual clean-up of the spill, there should
be a clearly defined clean-up policy with a clear indication
on when and how to deal with spills. The circumstances in
which spills are to be left alone should also be indicated in
that policy document. The let alone principle has to be
applied only when physical or mechanical clean-up has been
considered more harmful to the environment than the natural
degradation or the probability of damage is low.
Oil contingency planning is the means by-which such a
policy could be implemented in Namibia. The plan should make
provisions for various response options to be considered.
Such options should be based on a careful evaluation of
socio-economic, aesthetic and ecological factors of the
affected area as discussed under section 2.3.0. Some of the
factors to be considered in the evaluation process are those

77

discussed in chapter 2 (2.3.0). In relations to the summary
of different methods for the cleaning of differed shore lines
provided in Figures 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) of the appendixes,
the procedure on the clean-up operation is illustrated by the
information flow chart at the end of this chapter.
The identification of a possible source of shoreline
work force in the plan will help the OSC. to decide on
whether a spill response team should need iBBore personnel than
those indicated in the plan. This might be the case where
local labour are to employed for such a purpose. The
challenging task for the OSC in carrying out these
responsibilities is ensuring the availability of resources
discussed in the next section. It will be at this stage when
continuous surveillance is required to provide detailed
information on the spill movement. The capabilities of this
surveillance in determining the actual or potential size of
the spill may help the OSC to determine the size of his task
force.
While individuals responsible for oil spill clean-ups
are required to be familiar with any law prohibiting or
restricting the use o'f specific clean-up measures, the OSC.
should ensure that safety of personnel and properties
involved in the operation is his first priority. Safety
awareness nationwide should be one of the public education
programmes to be carried out by the OSC in conjunction with
the lead agency (NEPC). Taking into account that Namibia has
not been a maritime nation, such a program could cover a wide
range of environmental related topics, such as the importance
of the marine environment and marine environment protection
to the economic well being of the country.
Both formal and informal approaches could be used to
implement this program. The use of T V, radio and school text
books should be among the methods to be used. The government
should prepare information kits explaining how marine spills
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(a) Human Resources
It might not be sufficient to identify the availability
of a shoreline work force in the plan without looking into
the critical role of human resources in the clean-up
operation. It should be understood that it is the human
activities which result in oil spills and therefore, people
must be expected to clean-up the spill and restore the
condition of the environment. Such requirement in Namibia is
provided in Section 5 of the Prevention and Combating of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil Act of 1991.
In this section, human resources are identified in three
groups, namely, experts, skilled personnel (local members of
staff) and unskilled personnel. The availability of expert
personnel who are the driving force of the operation should
/

be ensured at all levels of the plan implementation. Since
foreign experts are likely to be contracted in the event of
an oil spill in which the Namibian government could
participate, it is important that the identified experts
should be accessible at any time. Because speedy reaction to
the spill mainly depends on experts, their early arrival
should be among the priorities of the on-scene co-ordinator.
If foreign experts are to be involved, special attention
should be given to their emergency travel documents.
Second to the experts, are the local staff as discussed
in part A. <D) above. It should be noted that without well
organized and qualified staff members serving in the above
mentioned groups, there is little chance for the clean-up
operation to succeed. Even if local staff members are
preferable, experienced foreigners should be contracted to
lead some of these groups with the assistance of local staff.
It is self evident that a small handful of newly trained
maritime personnel in Namibia would not be able to deal with
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a catastrophic oil spill. On this ground, the plan should
provide for possible use of foreign experts and/or response
teams. More on possible ways by which foreign response teams
could be arranged is discussed in sub-section <C) below.
Unlike the above two groups which consist of experts and
professionals, the last group is rarely made up of educated
personnel. The fisTiermen, port and municipal workers could be
among those used in Namibia today. Although the group is made
up of local people, it full participation in the coastal
clean—up operation is mainly influenced by two major factors,
i.e. the availability of food and accommodation. In the case
where a large number of these people are to be used, safety
and security regulations should be strictly observed. Many
safety related problems could be avoided if permanent bodies,
such as a coast Guard or navy, with standard safety rules and
regulations for oil spill operation activities, were to be
used.
<b) Equipment and Materials
The need for equ-ipment is equally important to that of
human resources in the clean-up operations of oil spills.
Without the required equipment, decisions on whether response
operations should start at sea or begin with protection of
the sensitive areas would be delayed. It is therefore
important that the plan should outline clearly the types of
equipment to be used and their accessibilities by the
response organisation. Considerations should be given to all
types of equipment, which includes those for containment,
recovery and support operations. Developing technology and
any new methods of dealing with oil spills should be
considered in determining the required equipment. The
government should therefore, prepare to have means of keeping
in touch with the relevant institutions on this matter. The
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World Catalog of Oil Soi11 Response Products By Robert
Schulze, could be among many to be recommended. But such
information could be found with almost every oil company.
The success of oil containment at sea depends on how
well the equipment is maintained and how fast boats and
vessels are being deployed for that purpose. The government
should establish its priority for obtaining fishing boats and
other vessels to help in such operations. No time should be
wasted to protect the marine environment from an oil spill of
any kind. Experience from other accidents shows that even if
containment at sea is preferable, oil can reach the shoreline
before the response team gets into full operation. In a case
where sensitive areas are likely to be affected, their
protection should be made in the quickest possible way.
However, if protection is not feasible, or the area to be
protected has been already affected, clean-up operation
details should be determined. The care which must be
exercised in the use of dispersants can not be over
emphasized in this paper as it should be under the control of
experts or scientists.
In the case where the response team has arrived at the
scene before all relevant equipment, simple equipment
available, such as locally made straw can be used although
this can only be done under the supervision and advice of the
experts.

(c) Means of Communications
Unlike the previous identified resources, which could be
either borrowed or jointly mobilized in conduction with
foreign institutions, the means of communications is mainly a
domestic issue. The previous section on surveillance has
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shown how important information is to the response of the
clean~up operation. It should be understood that this
information could be misguiding if there is no proper channel
through which it is conveyed to receive it. Adequate
communications are required to provide contact between
different sections of the operation including the
headquarters and afloat officers. The use of land telephone
lines, telex and radio facilities should be appropriately for
a -country like Namibia with a long uninhabited coastline.
The unique geographical nature of the Namibian coast may
require a well equipped communication centre in the case of
oil spill response. The aforesaid centre should be run by
knowledgeable persons as described in part A. <D) above.
Due to the scarcity and high expenses involved in the
resources mobilization and coordinations, proper thought
should be given to whether all are to be found and operated
from within Namibia or are to be obtained from foreign
sources. In the event whereby the latter has been preferred,
the arrangement should be made for a bilateral or
multi-lateral joint'contingency plan. If the bi-lateral
approach has been chbsen, then the Namibian government and
its counter parts have to agree on the roles each of them
should play in case spills take place. Never the less, if a
number of nations are involved, possibilities for IMO
involvement in the' plan formulation process should be
considered. Direct IMO assistance to Namibia may not be
needed as Namibia is a member to the Convention for
Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine
and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African
Region in Case of Emergency, the product of the UNEP. The
corporation has progressed in terms of organisation but a lot
needs to be done to make it of practical value.
Generally there are two ways by which international
arrangement on oil spill response could be made. First, a
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joint plan could be drawn up with or without joint response
to the incident. In this case parties have to decide on the
following :
- division of responsibilities between themselves;
- harmonization of the national plans to facilitate the
joint plan;
- the activation of the joint plan;
- the control of national resources and
- the means and channels of communications between
national authorities.
Secondly, the arrangement could be done in a rather
simple way of mutual assistance between states. Under such
arrangement, parties are simply seeking loans from each
other. The most important factor to be considered under such
arrangement is the placement of resources. It should be
clearly stated that requested resources should be absolutely
at the disposal of the requesting government or they will.
remain under the tactical control of the providing
government.
There is no doubt that state capabilities in dealing
with oil spills diffac from one to the other. In this regard,
Namibia may benefit from both the bi—lateral agreement with
South Africa who has already developed its response
capabilities and the multi~lateral arrangement of the West
and Central African region under the auspices of the UNEP.
The former is preferable especially for a short term because
there is no oil contingency plan in Namibia and other
countries in the regions, such as Angola, Mozambique and
Madagascar can benefit from it as well. Such an arrangement
could be extended to the sub-regional co-operation in oil
pollution control.
Namibia could be used as an oil spill response operation
centre for both the West and Central African and the sub
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regional co-operations. The country is well located
geographically and future development of oil may influence
such a decision.
A joint contingency plan should address issues, such as
the exchange of information on the type of resources each
party can make available, who is to be contacted in case of
an oil spill, the means of communications to be used and more
importantly, how resources are to be controlled during the
operation under the direction of a single on—scene commander.
In all cases, financial matters relating to operation
and expense recovery from the polluter needs to be well
understood by the parties concerned. Matters relating to
workers' wages and salaries, over time and currency in which
they are to be paid should be sorted out beforehand. In the
case of mutual assistance, all should be left for the
requesting party solve it.
5. Expense Recovery
This section provides information on administrative
procedures to be followed during an oil spill operation in
Namibia which the National Response Team may respond to. It
addresses only the costs associated with the physical removal
of the pollutant itself. It is intended to help the
government to recover most, if not all, of the money
expended during the clean-up operation. It refrains from
addressing legal implications covered by international
conventions discussed in chapter 2. Compensation for
environmental damage is left for the court of law and legal
experts.
Although compensation for the operational clean-up and
environmental damage are interrelated in the sense that all
are to be claimed from the polluter, there is a slight
difference in their administrative procedures. The proof of

environmental damage is far beyond the scope of this paper.
Under the law, the minister has authority to spend government
fund during an oil spill on the assumption that it should be
recovered from the polluter. To recover all what is impended,
a record of all expenditure and losses encountered during the
operation should be kept. An effective way to accomplish this
is through the full utilization of the Operation Group of the
On-Scene Command Team as discussed in Part A (D) 2 of this
chapter.
Without proper administrative machineries to take
account of all receipts and other relevant information on
stock piles, the state might not recover all the expenses.
The state should also be aware that, although the polluter is
financially liable for the pollution he causes, he has the
right to present proof before a court of law that the cost
and expenses claimed by the affected state are not
reasonable. If his challenge against to the state is
convincing, then the state must provide evidences to
substantiate its claim. If this can not be done, then it is
likely that the state will lose the case and suffer from the
consequences.
Following below are some of clean-up costs provided by
the Canadian Coast Guard by 1990. The amount is recorded in
Canadian and U.S. dollars where appropriately. The last
figure is on the "Katina P" incident off the Mozambican
coast. The barge "Nepco 140" which ran aground in the St.
Lawrence Seaway in 1976, released 1000 tonnes of oil and cost
$22.7 million Canadian to clean-up; In March, 1979, the
"Kurdistan" released more than 7 100 tonnes of Bunker C oil.
Clean-up cost more than $12.4 million Canadian; The barge
"Nestucca" released some 875 tonnes in December, 1988, with
costs and claims in excess of $15 million Canadian; The cost
to the U.S.A. federal government alone in 1990 for the Exxon
Valdez spill response was $122 million (U.S.); In February,
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1990 a grain carrier and a fishing vessel collided in the
Canadian waters which resulted in the latter releasing 40
tonnes of diesel oil. The associated clean-up cost were about
$1 million Canadian and The "Rio Orionoco" which grounded in
Canadian waters in October 1990, spilled some 100 tonnes of
oil. The costs for clean-up were $9 million CanadianIn the
case of "Katina P", off the Mozambican coast, the costs of
contracted labourers were estimated at only several thousand
U.S. dollars, simple because of the cheap labour system in
the country. However, the total claim was estimated at 4.5
million dollars (U.S.) ^
Because the state could be challenged and the
possibility exists of it losing the case, Namibia should not
found unprepared to recover the clean-up cost of any oil
spill. In determining a national contingency plan,
consideration should be given to designing a standard form
which could be used throughout the operation where a national
response team is involved. The form should be made easy to be
fill in and be attached to the plan. It should be subjected
to regular review and amendments by the NEPC.
In the case of a joint* operation each state should keep
records of costs for the operation, but, it is recommended
that the cost recovery be led by the country responsible for
funding the operation. At this stage, the involved states
need to have close co-operation as the polluter may try to
find all the loop holes to avoid paying the costs.
For the purpose of improving the government is response
capabilities, the plan should be reviewed immediately after
an operation. This will help the government identify the
strengths and weaknesses of the plan. The comments and
criticism of the public, the media and other interested
parties, if valid can be reflected by an amended plan. The
Technical Advisory Committee on Oil Spill Contingency Plan
(TAC) should be trusted with these immediate
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responsibilities. This should not interfere with the
periodical review of the plan by the NEPC and its advisory
committee < TAG) provided in part A. of this section.
6. Training and Exercises
How successful contingency plans are executed depends on
how well the participants have been trained. It is obvious
that Namibia is being faced with the problem of manpower
shortages in the .maritime field. This problem can be traced
from the fact that the country has never been a traditional
maritime nation. All of its maritime activities, including
the present operation of its only deep sea port, have been
carried out by South Africa. Although there are a few
Namibians who are trained in this field, such as the World
Maritime University graduates, and a few others who could
serve as heads of the above proposed groups under part A <D>,
their participation in such activities depends on their
placement in the civil service as a whole.
Since operational oil spills do not only result from
onshore activities, t*he country needs to have an operational
training program that covers the containment of oil spills at
sea as well. The interface of the onshore and offshore
operations should be seriously looked into before a training
program for those to be involved is designed. Before any
attempt is made to establish an operational training program,
one has to understand the objectives of the training.
Experience has shown that, apart from a coast guard or
a navy there might not be any other government institutions
that can be used to its full capacity for an oil spill
operation. Without proper institutions in place, the Namibian
government may find it difficult to find appropriate trainees
for such purposes. It should be understood that such training
should be organized and coordinated jointly by the industries
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and the government. The industry could play a major role in
determining the levels of people to be trained, where to be
trained and who to coordinate the training program.
Due to the uniqueness of the Namibian situation it is
suggested that Namibia consider the design of an operational
training program in line with that of the Canadian model,
which has particular relevance for Namibia. Although the
Canadian government structure is different from that of
Namibia, this program could fit well in Namibia with slight
alterations.
The proposed operational training courses were
introduced in Canada as a response to the Review into the
Tanker Safety in Canada of 1990 and The Nestucca Oil Spill
Recommendations on training and contingency planning
exercises. These courses were "felt to satisfying the
operational response training requirements of a wider range
of oil spill response personnel throughout the Canadian Coast
Guard
They are as follows:
(A> Basics of Oil Spill Response,
This course is designed for the following officers':
fleet system officers and senior crew, designated On-Scene
Commanders, deputy On-Scene Commanders, ship safety personnel
(Operational), the district superintendents and emergency
staff.
The course is designed to provide a basic understanding
of oil spill response functions, pollution countermeasure
system and operations sufficient to provide operational
technical direction for the spill response team in the areas
of containment, recovery clean-up and disposals.

(B>. Pollution Countermeasures Systems
This course is designed for senior fleet system officers
and crew, emergency pollution control officers and
operational staff and all the operational personnel employed
by the Canadian Coast Guard during an oil spill response. It
is designed to provide basic operational response of the
practical level prerequisites for undertaking operational oil
spills in the four mentioned areas under (A) above.
(C) Spill Site Coordination / Response Management
The course is designated for fleet systems officers,
deputy on—scene commanders, designated on—scene commanders,
spill site supervisors and district marine emergency
officers. The course is designed to provide basic spill site
co-ordination and supervision training prerequisite for
undertaking the management of an oil spill response at the
site level or an on-scene command for response to a small
spi11.
Although the two systems could not be equated, these
courses hold considerable potentially for Namibia. Even if
these courses do exactly fit the Namibias case, Namibia's
future training program would be well advised to be organized
along the same lines. It would benefit both the on-scene
Commander's Team, and the support agencies including the
private sector. Such training should be organized to minimize
the duplication of work at the real spills. Trainees should
be made to understand the interaction of both onshore and
offshore oil cleanup operations. The plan itself should
provide for the National Response Team to be involved in
spill of any size. Instead of monitoring the spill and moving
in only when local resources become overwhelmed, a national
response team should work with the local personnel from the
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start of the operation.
Contingency training exercises seem to be a problem for
many institutions. Without proper institutions in place to
provide necessary resources in the event of oil spills such
efforts are useless. Such training exercises should be
encouraged and provided at all levels of the plan.
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Conclusions and Recommendations

1. It should be noted that this dissertation deals with oil
pollution prevention of the marine environment in Namibia.
The first three chapters provided information on the
country itself, pollution related activities, scientific
information on oil pollution and the efforts of the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) in dealing with
oil pollution of the marine environment.
2. The Namibian marine environment is rich in both living and
non living resources, i.e fish, oil and gas respectively.
No doubt the two do not mix; therefore, exploitation of
the latter should be done in a proper manner allowing the
sustainability of the other.
3. The issue of environment protection to which marine
resources is a part has never been a concern of the South
African colonial administration in Namibia.
4. Apart from the fact that Namibia has never been a maritime
nation, all its maritime activities including the only deep
sea port of Walvis Bay are being administered by the South
African administration.
5. All the South African maritime laws have not administered
in Namibia and none of the international conventions, even
those to which South Africa is signatory, were not known
to Namibia.

6. The Prevention and Combating of Pollution of the Sea by
Oil Act of 1961 amended by the Namibian parliament never
met international requirements on oil pollution prevention
and control. The extent to which the provisions of the
newly passed Namibian laws, such as the Petroleum Act of
1991 and the Model of Petroleum Agreement are to be
adhered to will depend on the capabilities of the
responsible government agency and/or the companies to be
involved.
7. Although the scope of this paper is on the marine
environment, and more specifically on oil pollution, other
issues, such as the need for proper co-ordination of
environmental activities at state level and safety
incidents, such as fire extinguishing and life serving at
sea are noted. The former needs an urgent attention before
the commencement of the exploitation of oil and gas. The
latter should always be considered as part of the
contingency plan at all levels and are all covered in the
international convections discussed.
8. It should also be noted that the status of Walvis Bay has
negative impacts on the Namibian law enforcement in the
area of marine environment protection. Thus,’ there is need
for a solution to be found on this issue soon.
Recommendations
A. Preventive Measures
1.

Having recognized the need for harmonization and
integration of each of the environmental related
activities at a national level, a national environmental
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institution with an equal status to that of the National
Planning Commission should be set up. It could also be an
independent ministry or a separate department under the
President or the Prime Minister's offices.
2. In the area of oil pollution, a National Environmental
Protection Commission (NEPC) should be set-up (as
discussed in chapter 4. part A: (A). In facilitating its
work for the formulation of a national oil contingency
plan, the NEPC should be assisted by a Technical Advisory
Committee on Oil Spill Contingency Plan. The technical
committee should consist of the people from the relevant
ministries, experts from industries and/or learning
institutions and an on-scene commander who could be an
independent person appointed according to his experience
in the field of oil pollution.
3. Although the NEPC should be responsible for the
formulation and regular review of the plan, the Ministry
of Works, Transport and Communication should be the lead
agency for implementing the plan.
4. The Nabibian National Oil Contingency Plan should enable
the relevant government ministries, national and
international companies to combine efforts in fighting an
oil spill if one should occur in the Namibian waters. The
plan's objectives should be:
- protect the marine resources from harmful effects of oil
pollution through prevention and control of oil spills;
- increase the readiness level of both personnel and
equipment when facing oil spills incidents and
- institute an immediate and co-ordinated oil spill
response system for any oil incident in the Namibian
waters.
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The plan should cover all the Namibian coastal areas and its
EEZ. Both prevention, control and combating of all types oil
spills should be provided in the plan. This should include a
trans-boundary oil spill, which may require the activation of
the joint contingency plan if there is any.
5. Since some of the relevant institutions (the Coast Guard
or the Navy) are not yet in place, the author describes
only the roles they should play rather than posts. It is
therefore, up to the government to determine the extent to
which these functions are to be assigned by particular
institution (s). The author does belive that the Namibian
response structure should be made simple whereby all the
arrangements for the co-operation between different
institutions and the lead office should be worked out at
the planning phase. This will enable the on-scene
commander to control and co-ordinate response effectively.
The roles of other government and private institutions
should be clearly stipulated in the plan.
6. For the activation of the plan there should be a national
response team under one on-scene commander and his staff
members (as discussed under Chapter 4. B. (D)).
7. The success of oil response depends on proper
organization, co-ordination and mobilization of the
resources. All these require some know-how in the field.
Being non maritime people, Namibians do not have such
knowledge. Assistance for the attainment of such knowledge
should be sought at bi-lateral and multi-lateral levels.
Training under the IMO, UNEP regional Seas and/or through
the industries' training programs are among many to be
recommended. The priorities should be given to designated
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members of the On-Scene Commander Team who in turn will be
able to train their own people at home. The issue of joint
training and exercise for oil spill response needs full
trained forces. On this ground the establishment of the
Namibian Coast Guard or Navy with a specific role of plan
activation is recommended.
8. To give proper protection to the marine environment
against oil spills from any source, the state should
accede to and implement the above discussed conventions in
this paper (in section 2.4.0 of chapter 2).
9. In order to minimize risk of operational spills during
terminal operations, the government should establish
strict rules and regulations governing loading and
unloading operations. These should include and not limited
to:
.
- watch requirements during loading and discharging
operations to ensure the early detection of spill;
- regular inspections of the hoses and hose couplings by
government surveyors, (if possible, the flexible hoses
with higher safety standards should be fixed to the
piping system at all oil terminals), and
- other alternatives which fit the Namibian conditions
should be looked into as well.
10. In order to avoid and minimize illegal dumping of oil
bilge waters and other wastes, regulations should be
introduced which should:
- require terminals to provide reception facilities to
recede all ballast, slope and bilge water from all
tankers docking there;
- require terminals to receive oil containments water
before allowing them to depart;
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- require inspections to be done on whether all reception
facilities are being used according to the regulations,
and
— ensure that reception facility user costs are either
integrated with other port dues or/and as required by
the laid procedures.

B. Actual Response
1. In order to deter polluters, the Namibian Coast Guard/Navy
should be empowered to carry out a continuous,
co-ordinated and intensive aerial surveillance program all
over the Namibian waters including its EEZ and oil rigs.
As this requires dedicated surveillance air craft,
equipped with the latest spill detection and evidence
gathering technology, joint efforts should be made by all
those to be involved to ensure their availability.

The

establishment of a shore based satellite along the
Namibian coast should be considered as this could be used
for both oil spills and illegal fishing surveillances.
2. Apart from formal information and oil spill reporting
procedure, which are required to be included in the plan,
the NEPC in co-operation with other relevant ministries
should:
— disseminate information on the effects of marine spills
and spill reporting procedure and
- establish a system whereby people who filed reports
leading to the conviction of a polluter may be rewarded.
3. While the roles of Customs and Immigration Departments are
needed to facilitate the entry .into Namibia of oil spill
control experts and equipment, reporting of oil spill
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'

•

Namibia’s basins, other features

I Alil.ii M».5

Summary aj\\j)\‘vls of ait in some major eeosystems^
^

lixpcctcd recovery

1

licosysicin

lixpcctcd initial impact

Open, ocean

l.t(*,lrt: Impact ort pctapic plarrkton dependent on ciraricc
event «tf eontaclrng lloattri|; slick. Many otpanisnis rttay
avoid spill. Sitrlace dwellers may Ire alfccted. Not likely
that oil would aceirmulatc in o|reii-ucean sediments to
lethal or sub-lethal levels.

l-'asi: lta|>iil dispersion and degradation of oil.
lificcitve reproiloclion and dis|>crsal mechanisms (or
most pelagic organisms.

Outer continental slicIF

I.ight-moderatc: Impact on plankton populations light.
Itnpacl on spawnitt|> popirlations of Itsh larvae severe.
Aloilerate impact on irerrthic systems if oil reaches
hot lorn.

i'asi- niodcrnle: Fast recovery for plankttrn bec:iuse of
rapid regeneration limes. Ntoderale recovery of
Irettihic systems if oil reaches botiuin.

Open estuarine areas,
bays, channels and
liathouis

Moderate heavy: Chrortie oil ntay depress pt>|Hrlatioris
of fish amt some tientlios; or induce changes in species
aburtdance anti ttistriliiilritn. Spilled-oil ellccts
dcperulent on time tif year (spawning; migration, etc.)
and oil’s persistence.

I'asi slow: Dependent ort flushing characteristics,
route to lienihos, shoreline characteristics, and
community stability. Imlividoal year classes of larval
fauna may lie severely atlcclcd.

Wetlands, inarslies and
iiiangtovcs

lleavy.'^Prttcntial serious threat as result of vulnerability
to spills and sigriiticancc of estuarine functions (nursery
and breeding grmiruls; high prorluctivity). 1‘aunal
mortalities leading tir decreases itt population ilcnsity,
changes in s|rccies abitmlance amt ilisltibuliim. Damage
trr niarslt grasses alter repealed exposirte and decrease in
ptoditclivily. Damage to mangroves and neighbouring
grasses.

Moilerale slow: Persistence of oil in sediments
prolongs toxicity. Once oil is removed, biological
succession may lie moderate in some areas, since
organisms generally reproduce and disperse fairly
rapidly. Mangrove swamps particularly, complex and
may lake long to recover. Marsh areas may be
alfecled for many years.

Coral reefs

Unknown: Some reports of lethal and .sub-lethal
damage.

Unknown: Recovery could be slow liecausc of
sirirctural complexity of coral communities.

Polar ecosyslenis

Unknown: Smne reports of elfccis on arctic lakes and
on individual ttrgattisms

Unknown: Recovery could be slow since spilled oil
may persist longer at colder tem|K'ratures and since
polar organisms have slower growth rates, extended
life cycles, longer reproductive periodicity, and
narrower-ranging dispersal stages. However, recovery
may be more rapid liccausc organisms have already
adapted to harsh conditions.

*A(l:t|>U'il lioiii li)l:iiul aiitl ScliiicidcT (1976).

Source: Polltion scientific Background to the Global conventions (MARPOL & L.D).

Taiilu 50.6

Summary of proposed enviroumvutal ctasijjicotum in order of hureasinf* vidnerability to oil spill damaye
Vulnerahilily
imiex

\

Comments

Sliorclinc type

1

Hxposeil rocky heaillands

Wave rcilcctioii keeps most of the oil oll'shorc. No cican-up is necessary.

2

l-roding wave'Ciil plairorins

Wave swept. Most oil removed by natural processes within weeks.

3

I'inc-graincd sand Iwadics

Oil docs not penetrate into the sediment, facilitating incchanicul removal if
necessary. Ollierwisc. oil may |>ersist several nionllis.

4

Coarse-grained sand lieaclics

Oil may sink an<l/or be buried rapidly making clean-up dinicult. Under moderate
to low energy conditions, oil will be removed naturally within months from most
of the Ireacliface.

5

Hxposed. compacted tidal Oats

Most oil will not adhere to, nor penetrate into, the compacted tidal fait. Clean-up
is usually unnecessary.

6

Mixed sand and gravel licaclies

Oil may iimlergo rapid penetration and burial. Under moderate to low energy
comlitioiis, oil may persist for years.

7

Gravel beaches

Same as above. Clean-up should concentrate on the high-tide swash area. A solid
asphalt pavement may form under heavy oil accumulations.

8

Sheltered rocky coasts

Areas of reduced wave action. Oil may persist fur many years. CIcan-up is not
rccoinmcnded unless oil concentration is very heavy.

9

Sheltered tidal Oats

Areas of great biologic activity and low wave energy. Oil may persist for years.
Clean-up is nut recommended unless oil accumulation is very heavy. I'hese areas
should receive piiority protection by using booms or soil sorbent materials.

Salt marshes and mangroves

Most productive of aquatic environments. Oil may persist for years. Cleaning of
salt marshes by burning or cutting should be undertaken only if heavily oiled.
Mangroves should not be altered. Protection of these environments by bourns or
sorbent material should receive first priority.

10

After Gmidlacli anti Hayes (1978).

Source: Pollution

Scientific Background to the

Global Conventions (MARPOL & L.D)
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Source: SIDA, Transport and Communications
in Namibia

SCHEDULE III
From IMO Resolution A.542(13)

ITEMIZED LIST OF POSSIBLE EVIDENCE ON ALLEGED CONTRAVENTION
OF THE MARPOL 73/78 ANNEX I DISCHARGE PROVISIONS
1

ACTION ON SIGHTING OIL POLLUTION

1.1

Particulars of ship or ships suspected of contravention

1.1.1

Name of ship

1.1.2

Reasons for suspecting the ship

1.1.3

Date and time (GMT] of observation or identification

1.1.4

Position of ship

1.1.5

Flag and port of registry

1.1.6

Type (e.g. tanker, cargo ship, passenger ship, fishing vessel), size
(estimated tonnage) and other descriptive data (e .g. superstmcture colour
and funnel mark)

1.1.7

Draught condition (loaded or in ballast)

1.1.8

Approximate course and speed

1.1.9

Position of slick in relation to ship (e.g. astern, port, starboard)

1.1.10

Part of the ship from which discharge was seen emanating

1.1.11

Whether discharge ceased when ship was observed or contacted by radio

1.2 Particulars of slick
1.2.1

Date and time (GMT) of observation if different from 1.1.3

1.2.2

Position of oil slick in longitude and latitude if different from 1.1.4

1.2.3

Approximate distance in nautical miles from the nearest landmark

1.2.4

Approximate overall dimension of oil slick (length! width and percentage
thereof covered by oil)

1.2.5

Physical description of oil slick (direction and form, e.g. continuous, in
patches or in windrows)

Source; Canadian vi:: Pollution
Manual

Prevention

Offi

1.2.6

Appearance ol oil slick (indicate categories)
Caieaorv A Barely visitjle under most favourable light condition
Category B Visible as silvery sheen on water surface
Category C. First trace ol colour may be observed
Category D: Bright band ol colour
Category E. Colours begin to turn dull
Category F; Colours are much darker

1.2.7

Sky conditions (bright sunshine, overcast, etc.), lightlaD and visibility
ikiiometres) at the time ol observation

1.2.8

Sea stale

1.2.9

Direction and speed ol surface wind

1.2.10

Direction and speed ol current

1.3 Identification of the observer(s)
1.3.1

Name ol the observer

1.3.2

Organization with which observer is affiliated (if any)

1.3.3

Observer's status within the organization

1.3.4

Observation made from aircrali/ship/shore/othenrvise

13.5

Name or identity ol ship or aircraft from which the observation was made

1.3.6

Specific location of ship, aircraft, place on shore or otherwise from which
observation was'made
Activity engaged in by observer when observation was made, for
example: patrol, voyage flight (en route from .... to ....), etc.

1.3.7

1.4

Method of observation and documentation

1.4.1

Visual

1.4.2

Conventional photographs

1.4.3

Remote sensing records and/or remote sensing photographs

1.4.4

Samples taken from slick

1.4.5

Any other form ol observation (specify)

Note:

A photograph of the discharge should preferably be in colour.
Photographs can provide the following information, that a material 6n
the sea surface/s oil. that the quantity of oil discharged does constitute
a violation of the Convention, that the oil is beinn. o. iias been discharged
from a particular ship, the identity of the ship. ■

Experience has shown that the aloremennoned can be obtained with
the lollowing three photographs;
. 1 details of the slick taken almost vertically down from an altitude
of less than 300 m with the sun behind the photographer;
.2 an overall view of the ship and "slick" showing oil emanating
from a particular ship;
.3 details of the ship for the purpose of identification.
1.5 Other information if radio contact can be established
1.5.1

Master informed of pollution

1.5.2

Explanation of master

1.5.3

Ship's last port of call

1.5.4

Ship's next port of call

1.5.5

Name of ship's master and owner

1.5.6

Ship's call sign

2

INVESTIGATION ON BOARD

2.1

Inspection of lOPP Certificate

2.1.1

Name of ship

2.1.2

Distinctive number or letters

2.1.3

Port of registry

2.1.4

Type of ship

2.1J5

Date and place of issue

2.1.6

Date and place of endorsement

Note:

If the ship is not issued with an lOPP Certificate as much as possible
of the repuested information should be given.

2.2 Inspection of supplement of the lOPP Certificate
2.2.1

2.2.2
Note:

Applicable paragraphs of sections 2. 3. 4. 5 and 6 of the supplement
(non-oil tankersl
Applicable paragraphs of sections 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the
supplement (oil tankers)
the ship does not have an lOPP Certificate, a description should be
iven of the equipment and arrangements on board, designed to prevent
larine pollution.

2 3

Inspection of Oil Record Book (O.R.B)

2.3.1

Copy Sufficient pages of the O.R.B. - Part 1 to cover a period of 30 days
prior to the reponed incident.

2.3.2

Copy sufficient pages of the O.R.B. - Part II (if on board) to cover a full
loadino.'unloading/pallasting and tank cleaning cycle of the ship. Also
copy the tank diagram.

2.4 Inspection of the log-book
2.4.1

Last port, date of departure, draught forward and aft

2.4.2

Current port, date of arrival, draught fonrvard and aft

2.4.3

Ship’s position at or near the time tfie incident was reported

2.4.4

Spot check if positions mentioned in the log-book agree with positions
noted in the O.R.B.

2.5

Inspection of other documentation on board

2.5. f

Other documentation relevant for evidence lif necessary make copies)
such as:
• — recent ullage sheets
— records of monitoring and control equipment

2.6

Inspection of ship

2,6.1

Ship's equipment in accordance with the supplement of the lOPP
Certificate

2.6.2

Samples taken. State location on board

2.6.3

Tiacos of Oil in vicinity of overboard discharge outlets

2.6.4

Condition of engine-room and contents of bilges

2.6.5

Condition of o'lly-water separator, filtering equipment and alarm, stopping
or monitoring arrangements

2.6.6

Contents of sludge and/or holding tanks

2.6..7

Sources of considerable leakage

On oil tankers the following additional evidence may be pertinent:
2.6.8

Oil on Surface of segregated or dedicated clean ballast

2.6.9

Condition of pump-room bilges

2.6.10

Condition of COW system

2.6.11

Condition of IG system

2.6.12

Condition of monitoring and control system

2.6.13

Slop tank contents (estimate quantity of water and of oil)

2.7

Statements of persons concerned

If the O.R.B. - Part I has not been properly completed, kiformation on the following
questions may be pertinent;
2.7.1

Was there a discharge (accidental or intentional) at the time indicated
on the incident report?

2.7.2

Is the bilge discharge controlled automatically?

2.7.3

If so. at what time was the system last put into operation and at what
time was the system last put on manual mode?

2.7.4

If not. what were date and time of the last bilge discharge?

2.7.5

What was the date of the last disposal of residue and how was disposal
effected?

2.7.6

Is it usual to effect discharge of bilge water directly to the sea, or to store
bilge water first in a collecting tank? identify the collecting tank.

2.7.7

- Have oil fuel tanks recently been used as ballast tanks?

If the O.R.B. 'i- Part II has not been property completed information on the following
questions may be pe,rtinent:

2:7.8

What was the cargo/ballast distribution in the ship on departure from
the last port?

2.7.9

What was the cargo/balast distribution in the ship on arrival in the current
port?

2.7.10

When and yvhere was the last loading effected?

2.7.11

When and where was the last unloading effected?

2.7.12

When and where was the last discharge of dirty ballast?

2.7.13

When and where was the last cleaning of cargo tanks?

2.7.14

When and where was the last COW operation and which tanks were
washed?

2.7.15

When and where was the last decanting of slop tanks?

2.7.16

What is the ullage in ttie slop tanks and the corresponding height of
interface?

2.7.17

Which tanks contained the dirty ballast during the ballast voyage (if ship
arrived in ballast)?

2.7.18

Which tanks contained the clean ballast during the ballast voyage (if ship
arrived in ballast)?

